Call the Map

How the 2026 forecast performed

A performance review of the final CTMM 2.2 forecast for the Senate, the House and governors: scores against other forecasters and simple baselines, a component-by-component decomposition, what held up and what failed.

Forecast scored edition ctm-2.2-20261103-4b0dfb7f0237, frozen November 3, 2026, 12:00 ET
Results forecast-data commit 89c2edda03, 2026-11-13 (22 of 506 races not yet called)
Report November 14, 2026. Provisional until the results are certified; see section 12.

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Abstract

This report scores the final Call the Map forecast of the 2026 Senate, House and governor elections against the results, against twelve other model forecasts, and against simple baselines computed here. It then removes the model's components one at a time to measure what each contributed.

The forecast was the least accurate probability forecast among the seven sources that covered every office. Its Brier score was 0.0547 over 485 races when races that are not yet called are assigned to the current leader, and 0.0474 over the 471 called races. The best of the other models, Silver Bulletin, scored 0.0410 and 0.0336. The forecast favorite lost or trails in 36 races, and a Democrat won or leads every one of them. Forecast margins were 6.3 points too Republican on average.

One national shift explains 52% of the squared margin error. State effects explain 14% and race-level error 35%. Every source missed in the same direction. Our forecast was 1.5 points more Republican than the other models' average in the House and 1.7 points in governor races. With one fitted shift removed from every source, our Brier score ranks 5th of 7, so the ordering of races was ordinary for the field.

Three things held up under the same scrutiny as the failures. The seat distributions were wide enough: the results sit 1.3 standard deviations above our House mean and 1.2 above our Senate mean, inside the 95% intervals, where a model with independent races would have put the House result 5.7 standard deviations out. The Senate model beat every simple baseline (Brier 0.058 against 0.092 for presidential lean plus the generic ballot). In the 247 Republican-held seats our margins were closer than the average of the other models (mean absolute error 6.74 against 6.92).

The House model did not beat a two-line baseline. Presidential lean plus the generic ballot scored a Brier of 0.0512 against our 0.0509, with a lower margin error (6.58 against 7.45 points). Three poll-handling choices each moved the forecast toward Republicans in a year when the polls already understated Democrats: the poll-bias shift, the partisan-sponsor adjustment and the 60-day poll half-life. The 80% intervals contained 61% of results. The fixes that would have repaired 2026 made 2012 to 2024 worse in the backtest that has been run, and this report does not recommend adopting them on the strength of one election.

1. Scope

The report answers four questions. How accurate was the final forecast, and against whom? Did the model add anything to what simple rules already give? Which components helped, which hurt and which made no difference? What can and cannot be concluded from one election?

It covers the 506 races the final edition forecast: 35 Senate, 36 governor and 435 House. State legislative and down-ballot races are outside its scope.

The first postmortem (`docs/postmortem-2026/SCORECARD.md`, `DIAGNOSIS.md`, `FIXES.md` and `BACKTEST.md`, written November 7) established the ranking, a diagnosis and a backtest of proposed fixes. This report reuses its data loaders, recomputes every number on a later results snapshot, and adds the baselines, the component decomposition, the variance decomposition and the search for what worked. Where a number here differs from the November 7 documents, the cause is the later count unless stated.

Signs follow one convention throughout. Margins are Democratic minus Republican in points. An error is the forecast minus the result, so a negative error means the forecast was too Republican.

2. Data and methods

2.1 The forecast that is scored

The forecast is edition `ctm-2.2-20261103-4b0dfb7f0237` of CTMM 2.2 (variant `expert_free_22`), activated at 16:38 UTC on November 3, 2026, before the 12:00 Eastern freeze, and still the active edition on the data branch. Race probabilities and all-vote margins come from the capture of the public API at 17:09 UTC that the scorecard used. Two-party centers, their parts, the poll lists, the intervals and the joint simulation draws are read from the edition's own files on the `forecast-data` branch.

CTMM 2.2 builds each race's two-party margin in stages: a structural prior fitted on past cycles, a national-environment leg, race polls blended in by an evidence weight, and a calibration layer (a smooth compression for the Senate, a linear calibration called G1 for governors). Expert ratings and prediction-market prices do not enter any number. Fundraising is switched off in all three offices. A fitted distribution around the center gives the win probability and the intervals, and a joint simulation of 100,000 draws gives seat totals.

2.2 Results and races not yet called

Results are read from `results/2026` on the `forecast-data` branch at commit `89c2edda03`, committed November 13, 2026 at 22:39 UTC (index generated 22:39 UTC). The scripts export that commit once and read the export, so a rerun reads the same bytes.

At that commit 484 of the 506 races are called and 22 are not: 20 House, 1 Senate and 1 governor. The results index as a whole lists 653 races, and the other races that are not yet called are down-ballot offices outside this report.

A race that is not called takes the leader of the count at the pinned commit as its outcome. Every headline number is also shown for called races alone, and section 3.2 shows a harsher test in which every uncalled race within one point flips. Two races are handled differently. Louisiana's 5th and 6th districts held all-party primaries on November 3 and go to runoffs on December 12, as the results files state. A Democrat leads each first round with under 20% of the vote, while Republican candidates together took 63% and 57% of it. A first-round plurality is not a result, so both races are left out of every score and counted for neither party in seat totals. Alaska's ranked-choice races are scored by the first-choice leader.

Table 1. The race universe at the pinned results commit. A race is scored on probability if it had a Republican and at least one other candidate. The two-party panel is the set used for margin decompositions: a Democrat against a Republican, published as a two-way race, with under 15% of the vote for others.

Office	Forecast	Called	Not called	No Republican-versus-other contest	Runoff pending	Scored (probability)	of which called	Margin panel (all-vote)	Two-party panel
Senate	35	34	1	0	0	35	34	31	29
Governor	36	35	1	0	0	36	35	34	31
House	435	415	20	18	2	415	403	413	411
All three	506	484	22	18	2	486	472	478	471

Margins use the votes counted at the pinned commit. Of the 481 races with an estimate of the share counted, 202 are at 98% or more, and the median is 97.7%. Margins will move as counting finishes. The first postmortem found that projecting incomplete counts to their end changed mean errors by 0.1 to 0.3 points.

2.3 Other forecasters

Other forecasters' numbers are the captures made on November 3 for the site's comparison page, held outside the repository in the forecaster-review workspace: twelve models. Prediction markets were captured too and are not ranked here: a market price is a price, not a forecast. Each source's final forecast is its last capture before 23:00 UTC (6 p.m. Eastern), the rule the capture log set before the election. Appendix C lists every source with its capture time and its own last-update stamp. The first postmortem checked that freezing every source at our own 17:00 UTC cutoff leaves our rank unchanged on every race set.

Sources differ in coverage. Seven sources, ours among them, cover all three offices in full. Others publish the Senate alone, or the Senate and House without governors. Comparisons therefore use common race sets: for each office, the sources that cover at least 99% of the scored races and the races all of them forecast.

Silver Bulletin's scores come from its subscriber forecasts, as we captured them on November 3. Its forecast is published for paying subscribers and its race-by-race numbers are not ours to redistribute, so this report prints the scores we computed from them and none of its race-by-race probabilities or margins.

2.4 Metrics

All probability metrics use P(Republican wins), the one probability every source publishes on the same terms, because some sources place an independent in the Democratic column.

Metric	Definition
Brier score	The mean of (p − y) squared, where y is 1 if the Republican won. Lower is better. A forecast of 50% everywhere scores 0.25.
Log loss	The mean of −log of the probability given to what happened, with probabilities clipped at 0.1% and 99.9%.
Wrong calls	Races where the side given more than 50% lost. An exact 50% counts as half.
Discrimination (AUC)	The probability that a randomly chosen Republican win was given a higher P(R) than a randomly chosen Republican loss. It measures ordering and ignores level.
Calibration	The share of events that happened among forecasts of a given probability. The Murphy decomposition splits the Brier score into reliability (the calibration error), resolution (how far the forecast separates outcomes) and the uncertainty of the outcomes.
Log-odds shift	The single number that, added to every race's log-odds, minimizes that source's log loss. It is fitted to the results, one parameter per source. The Brier score after the shift shows what is left when a source's overall lean is removed.
Margin error	Forecast minus actual margin. Mean error is the signed bias. MAE is the mean absolute error. The MAE after removing a source's own mean error measures race-level accuracy.
Rank correlation	Spearman's correlation between forecast and actual margins.
Interval coverage	The share of actual two-party margins inside our 50%, 80% and 95% intervals.
Seat-distribution coverage	Where the actual seat count falls in the published simulated distribution.

Comparisons with other sources use all-vote margins as each source published them. Decompositions of our own forecast use two-party margins, because the model's center and its parts are two-party quantities.

Intervals on differences between two sources are paired bootstraps that resample whole states, 10,000 draws, 90% level. Races share one national error, so even these intervals are narrower than the true uncertainty about which forecaster is better in general.

2.5 Reproducibility

Every number in this text is filled in by the build script from the data files that the analysis scripts write. Appendix B gives the scripts, the pinned commits and the seeds.

3. Performance against other forecasters

3.1 Probabilities




Figure 1. Brier score of each source that covered all three offices. Filled circles: 485 races, with races not yet called assigned to the current leader. Open circles: the 471 called races.

Table 2. Probability scores on the all-office common set (7 sources). The log-odds shift is negative when a source was too Republican.

Source	Brier, leaders hold (485)	Rank	Brier, called only (471)	Rank	Log loss	Wrong calls	AUC	Log-odds shift	Brier after shift	Rank
Silver Bulletin	0.0410	1	0.0336	1	0.1412	26	0.9925	−1.28	0.0322	3
VoteHub Complete	0.0432	2	0.0365	2	0.1378	31	0.9950	−1.31	0.0297	1
VoteHub Legacy	0.0445	3	0.0380	3	0.1406	34	0.9948	−1.28	0.0309	2
On Point Politics	0.0477	4	0.0413	4	0.1633	29	0.9863	−0.19	0.0474	7
DDHQ	0.0498	5	0.0431	6	0.1642	34.5	0.9912	−0.85	0.0400	6
Race to the WH	0.0499	6	0.0423	5	0.1744	31.5	0.9901	−1.24	0.0362	4
Call the Map	0.0547	7	0.0474	7	0.1769	36	0.9905	−1.27	0.0378	5

Our forecast is last on the Brier score and on log loss under both outcome rules, and it has the most wrong calls (36 of 485; 31 of 471 among called races). The gap to Silver Bulletin, the best of the other models, is 0.0137 (0.0090 to 0.0192).

The bottom of the table is a cluster. Our gap to DDHQ is 0.0049 (interval −0.0003 to +0.0113), to Race to the WH 0.0048 (+0.0007 to +0.0092) and to On Point Politics 0.0070 (−0.0009 to +0.0156). Two of those three intervals include zero.

Table 3. Our scores and ranks by office, under both outcome rules.

Office	Outcome rule	Races	Sources	Our Brier	Rank	Best source	Our log loss	Rank	Our wrong calls	Our AUC	Rank	Our Brier after shift	Rank
Senate	leaders hold	35	12	0.0785	12	On Point Politics 0.0437	0.2452	10	3	0.9930	1	0.0410	4
Senate	called only	34	12	0.0739	11	On Point Politics 0.0432	0.2329	10	3	0.9927	1	0.0411	4
Governor	leaders hold	36	8	0.0767	8	On Point Politics 0.0251	0.2338	8	5	0.9965	5	0.0389	6
Governor	called only	35	8	0.0784	8	On Point Politics 0.0257	0.2364	8	5	0.9964	5	0.0400	6
House	leaders hold	414	9	0.0508	9	Silver Bulletin 0.0395	0.1662	7	28	0.9904	8	0.0374	7
House	called only	402	9	0.0424	8	Silver Bulletin 0.0310	0.1371	7	23	0.9950	8	0.0294	7
All three	leaders hold	485	7	0.0547	7	Silver Bulletin 0.0410	0.1769	7	36	0.9905	5	0.0378	5
All three	called only	471	7	0.0474	7	Silver Bulletin 0.0336	0.1514	7	31	0.9945	6	0.0311	5

With leaders holding, the picture by office is the same on the Brier score: last in the Senate, last among governor forecasts and last in the House. On called races alone we are 11th of 12 in the Senate, 8th of 8 among governor forecasts and 8th of 9 in the House. Governor races were the weakest office per race, with 5 wrong calls in 36.

The Senate set is small, 35 races, and ranks in it move with single results. Adding the one Senate race not yet called moves us from 11th of 12 to 12th of 12. Mississippi is the plainest case: the Democrat won there, and 11 of the 11 models that forecast the race favored the Republican. Senate ranks between the top and the bottom should be read as provisional.

The AUC column shows that discrimination was high for every source and that ours was not distinctive: 0.9905, 5th of 7. The Murphy decomposition says the same thing in other terms. Our resolution was 0.2046 (6th of 7) and our reliability error 0.0187 (7th of 7, where 1st is the smallest error).




Figure 2. Brier score as published (open circle) and after one log-odds shift fitted to the results (arrow head), 485 races, leaders hold. The shift is printed beside each source; a negative shift means the source was too Republican.

Every source needs a negative shift. Ours is −1.27 on the log-odds scale, close to Silver Bulletin's −1.28, the two VoteHub models' and Race to the WH's. On Point Politics needed almost none (−0.19). After the shift our Brier score is 0.0378, 5th of 7 (5th of 7 on called races). Removing the shared lean lifts us off the bottom and leaves us below the middle. The forecast's problem was its level first and its race-level content second.

3.2 Sensitivity to races not yet called

Table 4. Our headline scores under four treatments of the races that are not called. The close-race flip reverses the outcome of the 8 uncalled races whose current margin is under one point.

Treatment of races not called	Races	Our Brier	Our rank	Our wrong calls	Our log loss	Next-to-last source	Best model	Best source
Called races only	471	0.0474	7 of 7	31	0.1514	0.0431 (DDHQ)	0.0336 (Silver Bulletin)	0.0336 (Silver Bulletin)
Leaders hold (headline rule)	485	0.0547	7 of 7	36	0.1769	0.0499 (Race to the WH)	0.0410 (Silver Bulletin)	0.0410 (Silver Bulletin)
Leaders hold, except every uncalled race within 1 point flips	485	0.0524	7 of 7	34	0.1682	0.0476 (Race to the WH)	0.0388 (Silver Bulletin)	0.0388 (Silver Bulletin)
Leaders hold, and the two Louisiana first-round leaders count as winners	487	0.0585	7 of 7	38	0.1951	0.0536 (Race to the WH)	0.0449 (Silver Bulletin)	0.0449 (Silver Bulletin)

Our rank does not depend on the treatment. The level of every source's score does: uncalled races are close races, and adding 14 of them raises every Brier score by 16% or more. Assigning uncalled races to their leaders raises our wrong calls from 31 to 36. Appendix A lists every uncalled race with its current margin.

3.3 Margins




Figure 3. Our forecast two-party margin against the actual two-party margin, 29 Senate, 31 governor and 411 House races (the two-party panel). Blue: a Democrat won or leads. Red: a Republican won or leads.

Table 5. Margin accuracy on the 477 races for which all seven margin-publishing all-office sources gave a margin (all-vote margins as published).

Source	Mean error	MAE	RMSE	MAE after removing own mean error	Rank	Rank correlation (Spearman)	Rank	Races too Republican
On Point Politics	−1.5	5.00	6.51	4.89	6	0.9771	4	61%
VoteHub Complete	−5.1	6.08	7.36	4.07	1	0.9848	1	86%
VoteHub Legacy	−5.1	6.08	7.37	4.08	2	0.9847	2	85%
Silver Bulletin	−5.1	6.31	7.83	4.67	3	0.9785	3	83%
Call the Map	−6.3	7.12	8.70	4.79	4	0.9761	6	85%
DDHQ	−6.4	7.25	8.88	4.80	5	0.9752	7	87%
Race to the WH	−6.9	8.14	10.08	5.89	7	0.9768	5	83%

Our margins were 6.28 points too Republican on average, with a mean absolute error of 7.12 points, 5th of 7. DDHQ and Race to the WH were further off. On Point Politics had by far the smallest bias (−1.5) and the lowest MAE.

Race-level accuracy is the MAE after each source's own mean error is removed. Ours is 4.79 points, 4th of 7, behind the two VoteHub models (4.07) and Silver Bulletin (4.67). Our rank correlation between forecast and actual margins is 0.9761, 6th of 7. All seven sources are between 0.975 and 0.985. We ordered races about as well as the field did. We did not order them better.

Table 6. Our margin accuracy by office on each office's common set.

Set	Races	Sources	Our mean error	Our MAE	Rank	Lowest MAE	Our MAE after removing mean	Rank	Our rank correlation	Rank	Highest rank correlation
Senate	31	11	−5.4	6.43	9	On Point Politics 3.44	3.99	10	0.9734	8	VoteHub Legacy 0.9810
Governor	34	8	−5.1	5.83	6	On Point Politics 3.98	3.59	5	0.9664	3	Silver Bulletin 0.9722
House	412	9	−6.4	7.28	7	On Point Politics 5.21	4.94	6	0.9762	9	VoteHub Complete 0.9848
Senate+House	443	9	−6.4	7.22	7	On Point Politics 5.08	4.88	7	0.9762	9	VoteHub Complete 0.9850
All three	477	7	−6.3	7.12	5	On Point Politics 5.00	4.79	4	0.9761	6	VoteHub Complete 0.9848

3.4 Chamber control and seats




Figure 4. Forecast probability of Democratic control, 12 sources that published both chambers. Democrats won both: they hold 55 called Senate seats and 250 called House seats.

Table 7. Chamber-control probabilities.

Source	P(Democrats win the Senate)	P(Democrats win the House)	Mean Brier of the two
Poliwave	85%	99%	0.011
Silver Bulletin	82%	96%	0.016
Race to the WH	81%	96%	0.018
On Point Politics	81%	91%	0.022
50+1	79%	98%	0.021
ElectIt	79%	96%	0.024
Split Ticket	77%	92%	0.030
Midterm Forecast	76%	91%	0.033
VoteHub Complete	68%	89%	0.057
VoteHub Legacy	67%	89%	0.061
DDHQ	64%	84%	0.078
Call the Map	62%	83%	0.087

Both chambers went Democratic, and we gave that the lowest probability of any source in both: 61.9% for the Senate and 83.0% for the House.

Table 8. Seat results against our published seat distributions (100,000 simulations). The House result counts called seats and current leaders and leaves out the two Louisiana runoff seats.

Chamber	Result if leaders hold	Range while uncalled	Our median	Our mean	Our 80% interval	Our 95% interval	Our P(at or above result)	Result in SDs above our mean	80% interval if races were independent	SDs if independent	Our P(D control)
Senate, Democratic-aligned seats of 100	56	55 to 56	52	51.6	47 to 56	44 to 58	14.8%	1.19	49 to 54	2.5	61.9%
House, Democratic seats of 435	260	250 to 270	234	235.5	212 to 260	203 to 276	10.5%	1.30	231 to 241	5.7	83.0%
Governors, Democratic wins of 36	24	23 to 24	19	19.6	15 to 24	12 to 27	14.1%	1.21	18 to 22	2.5	n/a

Our medians were low by 4 Senate seats, 26 House seats and 5 governorships. Each result is at the top edge of our 80% interval and inside the 95% interval. Section 6.1 returns to why that matters.

Every source was low on seats. Summing each source's race probabilities gives an expected Democratic House count of 236 for us, 241 for Silver Bulletin, 255 for On Point Politics, against 260. Race to the WH was lower than us at 234.

4. Performance against simple baselines

A model earns its complexity only where it beats a rule that needs no model. Five baselines were computed for this report from information available before the election.

- The 2024 presidential margin in the state or district, unchanged.
- Presidential lean plus the generic ballot: the 2024 presidential margin relative to the nation, plus the generic-ballot average the model itself consumed (D+8.32).
- Previous result plus uniform swing: the seat's last result, plus the generic ballot minus the national House margin of the year of that result. Where the previous race was uncontested the rule falls back to presidential

lean plus the generic ballot. For redrawn House districts the previous result is the model's own reconstruction on the new lines.

- The plain average of a race's admitted polls, in polled races only.
- The model's own structural prior, alone and with its environment leg.

The first three need a probability, so each uses a normal distribution whose standard deviation is the root-mean-square error of the same rule on the model's historical rows from 2014 to 2024 (House 9.9 points for presidential lean plus the generic ballot, Senate 10.5, governor 20.1). Nothing from 2026 enters those widths. The poll average and the prior arms keep each race's published interval. All rows are scored on the two-party panel with leaders holding. The mean of the other model forecasters is shown for scale. It is not a baseline we could have computed alone.




Figure 5. The published forecast against simple baselines, the parts of the model, the other forecasters' mean: 29 Senate, 31 governor and 411 House races, leaders hold. Top row: Brier score. Bottom row: mean absolute margin error in points.

Table 9. Senate: baselines against the published forecast on the same races. The interval is a state-clustered bootstrap of our Brier minus the rule's; a negative value means we were better.

Rule	Races	Brier	Ours, same races	Ours minus rule [90% interval]	Wrong calls	Ours	MAE	Ours	Mean error	Rank corr.	Ours
Published forecast	29	0.0584	0.0584		2	2	6.65	6.65	−5.5	0.962	0.962
2024 presidential margin, unchanged	29	0.2049	0.0584	−0.1465 [−0.2185, −0.0789]	8	2	16.58	6.65	−16.6	0.915	0.962
Presidential lean plus generic ballot	29	0.0916	0.0584	−0.0333 [−0.0653, −0.0048]	5	2	8.16	6.65	−6.6	0.915	0.962
Previous result plus uniform swing	29	0.0995	0.0584	−0.0411 [−0.0718, −0.0124]	5	2	8.96	6.65	−7.6	0.907	0.962
Model prior alone	29	0.1510	0.0584	−0.0927 [−0.1624, −0.0321]	6	2	8.34	6.65	−8.1	0.955	0.962
Model prior plus environment leg	29	0.1021	0.0584	−0.0437 [−0.0973, −0.0005]	6	2	6.01	6.65	−4.7	0.955	0.962
Plain poll average (polled races)	24	0.0570	0.0705	+0.0135 [−0.0078, +0.0346]	1	2	6.08	6.50	−5.6	0.977	0.973
Mean of other model forecasters	29	0.0386	0.0584	+0.0198 [+0.0090, +0.0316]	1	2	5.61	6.49	−5.0	0.981	0.970

In the Senate the model beat every baseline clearly. Its Brier score was 0.0584 against 0.0916 for presidential lean plus the generic ballot and 0.0995 for previous result plus swing, and both intervals exclude zero. It made 2 wrong calls where those rules made 5. Its margin error was lower (6.65 against 8.16 points) and its ordering better (rank correlation 0.962 against 0.915). The whole gain comes from race polls: the prior with its environment leg scores 0.1021, worse than the baselines.

Table 10. Governors: baselines against the published forecast.

Rule	Races	Brier	Ours, same races	Ours minus rule [90% interval]	Wrong calls	Ours	MAE	Ours	Mean error	Rank corr.	Ours
Published forecast	31	0.0884	0.0884		5	5	6.14	6.14	−5.5	0.956	0.956
2024 presidential margin, unchanged	31	0.1989	0.0884	−0.1106 [−0.1742, −0.0511]	12	5	14.99	6.14	−11.7	0.721	0.956
Presidential lean plus generic ballot	31	0.1390	0.0884	−0.0506 [−0.1207, +0.0146]	6	5	8.87	6.14	−1.7	0.721	0.956
Previous result plus uniform swing	31	0.0878	0.0884	+0.0006 [−0.0560, +0.0578]	3	5	8.08	6.14	−2.1	0.891	0.956
Model prior alone	31	0.1158	0.0884	−0.0275 [−0.0729, +0.0170]	5	5	8.97	6.14	−7.6	0.922	0.956
Model prior plus environment leg	31	0.0943	0.0884	−0.0059 [−0.0453, +0.0345]	4	5	7.53	6.14	−5.6	0.922	0.956
Plain poll average (polled races)	30	0.0638	0.0913	+0.0275 [+0.0051, +0.0523]	2	5	5.70	6.11	−4.0	0.951	0.952
Mean of other model forecasters	31	0.0491	0.0884	+0.0392 [+0.0129, +0.0692]	2	5	4.40	6.02	−3.7	0.972	0.958

For governors the model's margins were better than any baseline's (6.14 points against 8.08 for previous result plus swing) and its ordering far better (rank correlation 0.956 against 0.891). Its probabilities were not. Previous result plus swing scored 0.0878 against our 0.0884, with 3 wrong calls against our 5. The baseline was less biased (−2.1 against −5.5), and in a year with a large one-sided miss a less biased rule wins on probability even with twice the scatter. The plain poll average did better than both: 0.0638 on 30 polled races, where our published forecast scored 0.0913.

Table 11. House: baselines against the published forecast.

Rule	Races	Brier	Ours, same races	Ours minus rule [90% interval]	Wrong calls	Ours	MAE	Ours	Mean error	Rank corr.	Ours
Published forecast	411	0.0509	0.0509		28	28	7.45	7.45	−6.6	0.976	0.976
2024 presidential margin, unchanged	411	0.1093	0.0509	−0.0584 [−0.0720, −0.0450]	59	28	15.20	7.45	−15.2	0.973	0.976
Presidential lean plus generic ballot	411	0.0512	0.0509	−0.0003 [−0.0094, +0.0106]	32	28	6.58	7.45	−5.2	0.973	0.976
Previous result plus uniform swing	411	0.0516	0.0509	−0.0007 [−0.0095, +0.0088]	35	28	6.40	7.45	−4.5	0.975	0.976
Model prior alone	411	0.0788	0.0509	−0.0279 [−0.0390, −0.0175]	44	28	9.46	7.45	−9.1	0.974	0.976
Model prior plus environment leg	411	0.0644	0.0509	−0.0135 [−0.0214, −0.0061]	39	28	7.76	7.45	−6.9	0.974	0.976
Plain poll average (polled races)	110	0.1441	0.1542	+0.0101 [−0.0118, +0.0307]	23	24	7.13	6.78	−4.8	0.836	0.912
Mean of other model forecasters	411	0.0425	0.0509	+0.0084 [+0.0048, +0.0126]	24	28	6.07	7.30	−5.1	0.984	0.976

In the House the model did not beat the two uniform-swing rules. Presidential lean plus the generic ballot scored 0.0512 and previous result plus swing 0.0516, against our 0.0509. Both intervals straddle zero. On margins both rules were better than the model: 6.58 and 6.40 points against 7.45. The reason is level. The rules pass the generic ballot through at full strength and ended 5.2 and 4.5 points too Republican, where the model ended 6.6 points too Republican. With each rule's own mean error removed, the model and presidential lean plus the generic ballot are tied at 5.06 and 5.06 points, and the rank correlations are 0.9760 and 0.9731.

The House model's prior does carry information that the raw presidential margin lacks. The unchanged 2024 margin scores 0.1093 with 59 wrong calls. What the model's 28 structural features, its environment leg and its district polls added over a uniform swing from the generic ballot was, in 2026, nothing measurable in aggregate. The model made fewer wrong calls than the two rules (28 against 32 and 35), which is the one House measure on which it led them.

The plain poll average is a narrow test, because only 164 of 471 races had polls. On those races the plain average beat the published forecast on the Brier score in all three offices (0.1166 against 0.1304 pooled). Section 5.4 shows why: the model's adjustments to the polls moved them the wrong way.

5. Component-by-component decomposition

5.1 Method

Each ablation removes one component, or reverses one choice, and reruns the model's own code. The prior and the evidence stack are refitted on every cycle through 2024 without the component and applied to the 2026 rows with the final edition's admitted polls and the generic-ballot average the edition consumed. The unablated run reproduces the published centers: the median absolute difference is below 1e-14 in all three offices, and the only races that differ are the three independent-led Senate races, which carry a prior adjustment outside this pipeline and are not in the two-party panel.

Two things are held fixed. The governor G1 calibration and each race's published interval are not refitted per ablation, so the differences below come from the center alone. Probabilities use a normal distribution with the published interval; on the unablated model this reproduces the published Brier score to 0.0003 in the Senate and closer elsewhere.

The same ablation is also run in the model's rolling-origin backtest: fitted on cycles before C, scored on cycle C at election eve, for the House in 2018 to 2024 and for the Senate and governors in 2012 to 2024. That column shows whether a component earned its place before 2026. It is not independent evidence in the strict sense, because the model's components were chosen with those cycles in view.

Margin and Brier changes are exact arithmetic on the same races and carry no simulation noise. The 90% intervals on Brier changes resample states. Chamber-control probabilities come from a one-factor simulation calibrated to the published seat spread and run under paired seeds, the same 20 seeds of 20,000 draws for the reference and for every ablation. The noise floor is the standard deviation of the paired difference across seeds, printed beside each number; it never exceeds 0.39 points.

In every table a positive change in MAE or Brier means the forecast got worse without the component, so the component helped. The 2026 verdict is mechanical: helped if removing it raises MAE by 0.10 points or more, or raises Brier by 0.0005 or more with an interval above zero; hurt in the mirror case; mixed if the two disagree; neutral otherwise.




Figure 6. Change in the 2026 Brier score when a component is removed or a choice reversed, with 90% state-bootstrap intervals: 29 Senate, 31 governor and 411 House races. Right of zero: the component helped. Scales differ by office.

Table 12. Senate ablations. Changes are the ablated model minus the model as run.

Component or choice	2026 MAE change	2026 mean-error change	2026 Brier change [90% interval]	Expected D wins	P(D control), points (paired-seed SD)	Past MAE change	Past Brier change	Past cycles it lowered MAE	2026 verdict
Race polls	−0.51	+1.10	+0.0442 [+0.0005, +0.0985]	−0.6	−11.2 (±0.27)	+3.52	+0.0251	7 of 7	mixed
Presidential lean	−0.13	−0.09	+0.0009 [+0.0001, +0.0019]	+0.1	+0.1 (±0.03)	+0.25	+0.0021	6 of 7	mixed
Previous results	−0.12	+0.39	+0.0015 [−0.0003, +0.0049]	+0.1	+0.3 (±0.05)	+0.71	+0.0008	5 of 7	hurt
Incumbency and open seats	+0.47	−0.78	−0.0005 [−0.0010, +0.0000]	−0.0	+0.3 (±0.05)	−0.05	−0.0001	3 of 7	helped
Midterm and White House terms	+0.91	−0.96	+0.0001 [−0.0006, +0.0012]	−0.1	+0.1 (±0.02)	−0.22	−0.0022	3 of 7	helped
National-environment leg	+0.88	−1.42	+0.0004 [−0.0003, +0.0011]	−0.2	−0.4 (±0.04)	+0.00	+0.0001	2 of 7	helped
Center calibration (Senate compression)	+0.20	−0.56	+0.0019 [+0.0004, +0.0033]	−0.0	−1.1 (±0.07)	+0.59	+0.0020	6 of 7	helped
Poll weighting (against full weight)	+0.12	−0.12	+0.0021 [−0.0000, +0.0063]	+0.2	+0.3 (±0.04)	not run			helped
60-day poll half-life (against 14 days)	−0.54	+0.59	−0.0075 [−0.0126, −0.0029]	+0.3	+4.2 (±0.12)	+0.19	+0.0008	5 of 7	hurt
Partisan-sponsor adjustment	−0.02	+0.02	+0.0010 [+0.0003, +0.0019]	−0.0	−0.3 (±0.04)	+0.00	+0.0000	1 of 7	helped
Poll-bias shift	−1.08	+1.20	−0.0210 [−0.0327, −0.0103]	+1.0	+10.9 (±0.17)	+0.13	−0.0019	3 of 7	hurt
Leaving fundraising out	+0.19	−0.08	−0.0001 [−0.0003, +0.0001]	−0.0	−0.1 (±0.02)	−0.04	−0.0001	4 of 7	helped

Table 13. Governor ablations.

Component or choice	2026 MAE change	2026 mean-error change	2026 Brier change [90% interval]	Expected D wins	Past MAE change	Past Brier change	Past cycles it lowered MAE	2026 verdict
Race polls	+1.49	+1.27	−0.0006 [−0.0413, +0.0388]	+0.8	+5.10	+0.0718	7 of 7	helped
Presidential lean	+0.48	−0.48	+0.0000 [+0.0000, +0.0001]	+0.0	+0.36	+0.0042	4 of 7	helped
Previous results	+0.06	−0.06	−0.0000 [−0.0000, −0.0000]	−0.0	+0.03	+0.0009	4 of 7	neutral
Incumbency and open seats	−0.04	+0.04	−0.0009 [−0.0026, −0.0000]	+0.0	−0.12	−0.0003	1 of 7	hurt
Midterm and White House terms	+0.14	−0.14	−0.0000 [−0.0000, +0.0000]	−0.0	+0.05	−0.0002	4 of 7	helped
Candidate experience	+0.04	−0.04	−0.0000 [−0.0000, +0.0000]	−0.0	−0.08	−0.0006	3 of 7	neutral
National-environment leg	+0.08	−0.08	−0.0000 [−0.0000, +0.0000]	−0.0	−0.00	−0.0001	4 of 7	neutral
Center calibration (Senate compression)	+0.27	−0.27	+0.0000 [+0.0000, +0.0000]	+0.0	+0.20	+0.0002	5 of 7	helped
Governor G1 calibration	+1.25	−1.17	+0.0097 [+0.0058, +0.0140]	−0.5	not run			helped
Poll weighting (against full weight)	−0.01	+0.01	+0.0000 [+0.0000, +0.0001]	+0.0	not run			neutral
60-day poll half-life (against 14 days)	−0.12	+0.43	−0.0085 [−0.0279, +0.0110]	+0.8	−0.01	+0.0021	4 of 7	hurt
Partisan-sponsor adjustment	+0.02	+0.10	−0.0045 [−0.0119, +0.0010]	+0.2	+0.01	−0.0011	2 of 7	neutral
Poll-bias shift	−1.70	+2.52	−0.0350 [−0.0618, −0.0104]	+2.2	+0.35	+0.0074	3 of 7	hurt
Leaving fundraising out	+0.00	+0.00	+0.0000 [+0.0000, +0.0000]	+0.0	+0.00	+0.0000	0 of 7	neutral

Table 14. House ablations.

Component or choice	2026 MAE change	2026 mean-error change	2026 Brier change [90% interval]	Expected D wins	P(D control), points (paired-seed SD)	Past MAE change	Past Brier change	Past cycles it lowered MAE	2026 verdict
Race polls	+0.30	−0.26	+0.0135 [+0.0060, +0.0214]	−4.8	−2.6 (±0.15)	+0.33	+0.0049	3 of 4	helped
Presidential lean	+0.01	+0.33	−0.0013 [−0.0034, +0.0007]	+2.4	+1.9 (±0.13)	+0.98	+0.0034	4 of 4	neutral
Previous results	−0.00	+0.17	+0.0000 [−0.0032, +0.0028]	+0.7	+0.9 (±0.08)	+0.24	+0.0003	3 of 4	neutral
Incumbency and open seats	+0.06	−0.14	−0.0008 [−0.0029, +0.0011]	+1.1	+0.1 (±0.10)	+0.03	+0.0019	2 of 4	neutral
Midterm and White House terms	+0.42	−0.76	+0.0014 [−0.0003, +0.0034]	−1.9	−1.2 (±0.11)	+1.70	+0.0045	3 of 4	helped
Demographics and region	−0.02	+0.02	−0.0001 [−0.0007, +0.0005]	+0.1	+0.1 (±0.06)	+0.04	−0.0014	4 of 4	neutral
National-environment leg	+1.40	−1.79	+0.0033 [+0.0018, +0.0050]	−3.2	−3.9 (±0.13)	+0.07	−0.0003	1 of 4	helped
Center calibration (Senate compression)	+0.00	+0.00	+0.0000 [+0.0000, +0.0000]	+0.0	+0.0 (±0.00)	+0.04	−0.0000	1 of 4	neutral
Poll weighting (against full weight)	+0.21	+0.11	+0.0010 [−0.0019, +0.0043]	+2.7	+0.8 (±0.09)	not run			helped
60-day poll half-life (against 14 days)	+0.05	−0.07	+0.0009 [−0.0007, +0.0024]	−1.0	+0.6 (±0.09)	−0.00	−0.0007	2 of 4	neutral
Partisan-sponsor adjustment	−0.11	+0.17	−0.0050 [−0.0074, −0.0028]	+3.4	+3.7 (±0.13)	+0.01	+0.0001	2 of 4	hurt
Leaving fundraising out	+0.00	+0.00	+0.0000 [+0.0000, +0.0000]	+0.0	+0.0 (±0.00)	−0.01	+0.0000	0 of 4	neutral




Figure 7. Change in mean absolute margin error when a component is removed: 2026 (filled) against the held-out past cycles (open; House 2018 to 2024, four cycles; Senate and governor 2012 to 2024, seven cycles). Right of zero: the component helped.

5.2 Fundamentals: partisan lean, previous results, incumbency

Presidential lean and previous results are the backbone of the prior in past cycles. Removing lean costs 0.98 points of House MAE over 2018 to 2024, and removing previous results costs 0.71 points in the Senate. In 2026 neither removal changed the aggregate score by a measurable amount in the House or Senate (House Brier change −0.0013 and +0.0000). The two carry overlapping information, so the model rebuilds most of one from the other when either is dropped. For governors, lean helped in both periods (+0.48 points of MAE in 2026).

Incumbency was close to neutral. Removing every incumbency and open-seat term changes the 2026 House Brier by −0.0008 and the governor Brier by −0.0009. It helped Senate margins by 0.47 points of MAE and lowered governor MAE in only 1 of 7 past cycles. Demographics and region in the House prior, and candidate experience in the governor prior, changed nothing measurable in 2026.

The midterm and White House terms helped in 2026. These are the constants that tell the prior a midterm under a Republican president favors Democrats. Without them the House forecast is 0.76 points more Republican, its MAE 0.42 points worse and its expected Democratic seats 1.9 lower. Senate MAE is 0.91 points worse without them. The first postmortem asked whether the prior had ignored the midterm penalty. It had not: the prior alone expected House Democrats to run 5.8 points ahead of the 2024 presidential margin in the average district. The actual figure was 14.9.

5.3 The national environment and the House elasticity

The model read one national signal, a 60-day average of generic-ballot polls. The edition consumed D+8.32. A fitted mapping turned that into an environment estimate of D+7.11, because in the six training cycles the generic ballot had more often overstated Democrats. The estimate then reached races through a fitted elasticity: 0.31 in the House, 0.52 in the Senate and 0.30 for governors. In the House the leg added 2.21 points to every district before polls.

The national House vote counted so far is D+14.0 in two-party terms across all seats and D+11.8 in seats both parties contested. The first postmortem's figure, from the November 7 count, was D+13.1. The model's own House forecasts, weighted by 2024 turnout, implied D+6.5, and the site's displayed environment was D+8.6. The model's board sat below its own displayed environment.

The leg helped. Without it the House forecast is 1.79 points more Republican, MAE rises by 1.40 points, the Brier score by 0.0033 (interval above zero), expected Democratic seats fall by 3.2 and the probability of a Democratic House by 3.9 points. Senate MAE rises by 0.88 points. In past cycles the leg was neutral (House MAE change +0.07).

It helped too little. Two counterfactuals in section 7 size that. With an elasticity of one and the same environment estimate, expected Democratic House seats rise by 11.1 and the pooled margin MAE falls from 7.32 to 5.59 points. With the generic ballot also taken at face value, seats rise by 14.9. This is the mechanism behind section 4's result that a uniform-swing rule matched the House model. It is also a hindsight result: the first postmortem showed that raising the elasticity on top of the current prior would have worsened the House forecast in each of 2018, 2020, 2022 and 2024, and the backtest in section 9 rejected the re-specification that was meant to fix it.

5.4 Polls: the average, its weight and three adjustments

Race polls were the most valuable component for probabilities. Removing them raises the 2026 Brier score by 0.0442 in the Senate and 0.0135 in the House, lowers the probability of a Democratic Senate by 11.2 points, and in past cycles costs 3.52 points of Senate MAE and 5.10 points of governor MAE. Their effect on 2026 margins was uneven. In the Senate, removing polls lowers MAE by 0.51 points: the poll input after the shift was more Republican than the prior plus environment (Table 15), so polls improved the ordering of Senate races and their probabilities while making the average margin worse. For governors the polls improved margins by 1.49 points of MAE and left the Brier score unchanged (−0.0006). The poll-bias shift discussed below is the likely reason: without the shift the governor Brier score falls to 0.0536.

The polls themselves missed. In the last 30 days, 565 admitted polls in the two-party panel were 4.6 points too Republican on average, and the average of recent polls was too Republican in 90 of 119 polled races. Republican-sponsored polls missed by 6.9 points (58 polls), polls without a partisan sponsor by 4.7 (416) and Democratic-sponsored polls by 2.3 (91). Older polls were further off: 6.7 points for polls more than 60 days old against 4.4 for the final week.

Table 15. The poll input at each stage, polled races of the two-party panel. Each cell is mean error / MAE in points; negative means too Republican.

Office	Polled races	Plain poll average	After recency, size and sponsor rules	After the poll-bias shift	Prior plus environment	Published center	Published closer than the plain average	Published closer than prior plus environment
Senate	24	−5.55 / 6.08	−5.64 / 6.03	−7.20 / 7.36	−5.44 / 6.17	−6.50 / 6.50	9 of 24	11 of 24
Governor	30	−4.03 / 5.70	−4.12 / 5.61	−6.64 / 7.46	−5.27 / 7.26	−5.49 / 6.11	10 of 30	18 of 30
House	110	−4.76 / 7.13	−5.64 / 7.56	−5.64 / 7.56	−7.04 / 7.92	−6.07 / 6.78	48 of 110	73 of 110
All three	164	−4.74 / 6.72	−5.36 / 6.98	−6.05 / 7.52	−6.49 / 7.54	−6.02 / 6.62	67 of 164	102 of 164

Table 15 follows the poll input through the model. The plain average was 4.74 points too Republican. The recency, sample-size and sponsor rules moved it to 5.36. The poll-bias shift moved the Senate and governor inputs to 7.20 and 6.64. The published center was closer to the result than the plain poll average in 67 of 164 polled races, fewer than half. It was closer than the prior plus environment in 102.

The poll-bias shift was the costliest single choice in the statewide races. It is a fitted correction, the shrunken average of past election-eve poll errors, added to every Senate and governor poll average: 1.57 points toward Republicans in the Senate and 2.53 for governors. Refitting without it lowers Senate MAE by 1.08 points and the Senate Brier score by 0.0210 (from 0.0587 to 0.0377), adds 1.0 expected Democratic seat and raises the probability of a Democratic Senate by 10.9 points, to 74%. For governors it lowers MAE by 1.70 points and the Brier score from 0.0886 to 0.0536, and adds 2.2 expected Democratic governorships. In past cycles its record was modest. Removing it costs 0.13 points of Senate MAE and 0.35 of governor MAE on average, and it lowered MAE in 3 of 7 Senate cycles and 3 of 7 governor cycles.

The partisan-sponsor adjustment hurt the House. The rule subtracts 2 points from a Democratic-sponsored poll and adds 2 to a Republican-sponsored one. In the final month 56 of 113 admitted House polls were Democratic-sponsored and 4 were Republican-sponsored, so the rule moved House averages toward Republicans on net. The Democratic-sponsored polls were already 3.1 points too Republican before the rule moved them further. Refitting without the rule lowers the House Brier score by 0.0050 (interval below zero), adds 3.4 expected Democratic seats and raises the probability of a Democratic House by 3.7 points. In past cycles the rule made no measurable difference (House MAE change +0.01).

The 60-day poll half-life hurt the Senate. Opinion moved toward Democrats through October, and a long half-life kept older polls in the average. With a 14-day half-life the Senate MAE is 0.54 points lower, the Brier score 0.0075 lower and the probability of a Democratic Senate 4.2 points higher. The House is unchanged. In past cycles the 60-day setting was the better one for the Senate, in 5 of 7 cycles.

Poll weighting was neutral to slightly helpful. Giving polls full weight wherever a race has any raises House MAE by 0.21 points and Senate MAE by 0.12. The model estimates no pollster house effects: the aggregator weights polls by recency, sample size and sponsor and ignores pollster identity beyond counting one poll per pollster. There is nothing to ablate, and the first postmortem found that named pollsters' errors ranged from under 1 point to more than 8.

5.5 Calibration layers

Both calibration layers helped. The governor G1 calibration, a fitted linear stretch of the center, lowered governor MAE by 1.25 points and the Brier score by 0.0097 (interval above zero). The Senate center calibration and compression lowered Senate MAE by 0.20 points and the Brier score by 0.0019 (interval above zero), and it lowered MAE in 6 of 7 past cycles. The House has no center calibration, so its row is zero by construction.

5.6 Fundraising

Fundraising was off in the production model in all three offices, so it contributed nothing to the 2026 forecast. Switching it on for the Senate, the one office with 2026 finance data wired into the model, would have raised Senate MAE by 0.19 points and left the Brier score unchanged (−0.0001). In past cycles its effect is within 0.04 points of MAE in every office. Leaving it out was the right call or an immaterial one.

5.7 Prediction markets

Prediction markets were display-only in CTMM 2.2, with weight zero in every race. Whether a forecast should take market prices as an input is a policy question about independence, and Call the Map settled it for 2026 by leaving them out. This report does not rank markets beside the forecasts, because a market price is a price, not a forecast.

5.8 Independent, third-candidate and ranked-choice races

Table 17. Probability scores by race type, all-office sources, leaders hold.

Race type	Races	Our Brier	Mean of other models	Our rank among the seven all-office sources	Our wrong calls	Field-mean wrong calls
Independent-led or third principal candidate	8	0.1031	0.1116	2 of 7	1	1
Ranked-choice rules (Alaska, Maine federal)	6	0.1218	0.0801	6 of 7	0	0
Top-two primary states (California, Washington)	53	0.0038	0.0016	6 of 7	0	0
Majority or runoff rules (Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi)	26	0.0436	0.0372	7 of 7	2	1
Ordinary two-party plurality	394	0.0619	0.0497	7 of 7	34	27

The special-race rules adopted on October 5 held up where an independent or a third principal candidate was in the race. In those 8 races our Brier score was 0.1031, 2nd of 7 sources and better than the other models' mean (0.1116). Eight races cannot carry much weight, and the first postmortem found that the independents' own polls overstated them in three of four Senate races. In the 6 ranked-choice races we ranked 6th of 7, and three of those are Alaska races that are not yet called.

5.9 Correlation structure and uncertainty

The joint simulation is the component that did the most for the headline claims the forecast made, and section 6.1 gives the evidence. In brief: the draws gave the average error across races a standard deviation of 3.9 points in the House and 4.4 in the Senate. The realized shared errors were 6.3 and 5.5 points, 1.6 and 1.2 standard deviations. The total size of the shared shock was about right.

Its split was wrong. A common factor carries 25% of a House race's variance in the draws and 28% of a Senate race's. In the realized errors the shared mean is 53% and 51% of the mean squared error. Race-level intervals were therefore too narrow against a shared miss and too wide once it is removed: with the mean error taken out, the Senate and governor 80% intervals cover 97% and 94% of results.

5.10 Turnout and early vote

The model has no turnout or early-vote term. The early-vote counts the site published were never a forecast input, as the operations runbook states. There is nothing to ablate.

5.11 The expert-free decision

Expert ratings were removed from every office on September 9 as a policy of independence. The paired comparison recorded that day, on the same inputs with all downstream layers refitted, moved expected Democratic House seats from 226.3 to 229.4, left the Senate unchanged (50.02 to 50.03 seats) and moved expected Democratic governorships from 18.90 to 18.99. The House moved 3 seats toward the eventual result. On historical validation the removal was a trade: House MAE 5.68 to 5.64, House Brier .0396 to .0414 (`docs/model/ctmm22-candidates-2026-09-08/EXPERT_FREE.md`).

Its effect on the final forecast cannot be measured. No ratings were collected after September 8, so there is no November rating to add back. One captured comparison bears on it: VoteHub published a model with expert ratings and Kalshi prices (Complete) beside one without (Legacy). Complete scored 0.0432 and Legacy 0.0445, a difference of 0.0013. That is another forecaster's model and bundles two inputs, so it shows the order of magnitude and no more.

5.12 Summary of the decomposition

Six components helped in 2026: race polls (on probabilities in the Senate and House, and on margins for governors), the national-environment leg, the midterm and White House terms, the governor G1 calibration, the Senate center calibration and the joint simulation's shared error.

Four hurt: the poll-bias shift in the Senate and governor races, the partisan-sponsor adjustment in the House, the 60-day poll half-life in the Senate and the low House elasticity.

The rest were neutral: incumbency, demographics and region, candidate experience, poll weighting, and previous results and presidential lean in the House, where each is rebuilt from the other when removed. Fundraising was off. Pollster house effects, turnout, early vote, prediction markets and expert ratings were not in the model.

Every component that hurt in 2026 moved the forecast toward Republicans, and each had a neutral or mildly positive record in earlier cycles. None was a mistake that the pre-2026 evidence would have caught.

6. What performed well

Each claim in this section has a number, a comparison and a denominator. Section 6.9 lists the candidate strengths that were tested and did not hold.

6.1 The seat distributions and the shared error

The forecast's statements about chambers were statements about a distribution, and the distributions held. Democrats hold or lead 260 House seats against a published mean of 235.5 and a standard deviation of 18.8. The result is 1.30 standard deviations above the mean, at the edge of the 80% interval (212 to 260) and well inside the 95% interval (203 to 276). The forecast gave 10.5% to a Democratic count this high or higher. The Senate result of 56 is 1.19 standard deviations above the mean of 51.6, and the 24 governorships are 1.21 above 19.6. Three results near the 88th to 90th percentile of three distributions is what one shared error of moderate size looks like.




Figure 8. Published seat distributions (100,000 simulations each) with the result if current leaders hold. The pale band is the range of possible results while 1 Senate, 20 House and 1 governor races are uncalled.

The comparison that shows this was earned is the same forecast without its correlation structure. If each race had been drawn independently from its published probability, the House distribution would have had a standard deviation of 4.2 seats and an 80% interval of 231 to 241. The actual 260 would have been 5.7 standard deviations out, an event that distribution gives a probability below one in ten million. The Senate result would have been 2.5 standard deviations out with a probability of 1.3%, against the published 14.8%. The joint simulation multiplied the House seat variance by 20.

The size of the shared shock was also right against history. The model's election-eve mean error on held-out cycles from 2018 to 2024 has a root mean square of 3.2 points in the House and 3.9 in the Senate. The draws carried 3.9 and 4.4. The 2026 miss of 6.3 and 5.5 points had a one-sided probability of 5% and 10% under the model's own draws. A forecast that says a five- or six-point shared miss toward one party happens about one time in ten or twenty, and then meets one, has described its uncertainty correctly at the chamber level.

Table 18. Election-eve mean error of the same model on held-out cycles and in 2026 (two-party points; negative means too Republican).

Office	2018	2020	2022	2024	2026	RMS, 2018 to 2024	RMS with 2026
House	+0.43	+4.50	−4.64	−0.14	−6.61	3.24	4.14
Senate	+3.89	+6.33	−1.15	+1.77	−5.46	3.86	4.23
Governor	−3.90	+6.45	−0.42	+3.33	−5.53	4.13	4.44

This strength has a limit that section 3.4 already showed. A wide distribution centered too low still gave Democratic control of the Senate 62%, the lowest figure of any source.

6.2 The Senate model against baselines, and governor margins

Section 4 gave the numbers. In the 29 two-way Senate races the model's Brier score was 0.0584 against 0.0916 for the best simple rule, a difference whose 90% interval excludes zero, with 2 wrong calls against 5. For governors the model's margin MAE was 6.14 points against 8.08 for the best rule, and its rank correlation 0.956 against 0.891. In both statewide offices the model knew much more about the order of races than lean and history do. Polls supplied that knowledge: section 5.4 showed that removing them raises the Senate Brier score by 0.0442.

6.3 Margins in Republican-held seats

In the 247 Republican-held seats of the two-party panel our margin MAE was 6.74 points and our mean error −6.0. The mean of the other model forecasters, which as an average of several models is a hard benchmark, had an MAE of 6.92 and a mean error of −6.5. The same holds for seats with a Republican incumbent running (6.81 against 7.01, 185 races) and, by a wider gap, for seats that voted Republican for president by 20 points or more (6.86 against 7.63, 142 races).

Two cautions belong beside this. These are mostly safe seats, so better margins there did not improve the probability score: our Brier in Republican-held seats was 0.0855 against the field mean's 0.0706. And the mirror image is one of the largest failures in section 8: in Democratic-held seats our MAE was 7.64 against 4.83. Our forecast erred by a similar amount in both kinds of seat. The field's error was less than half as large in Democratic-held seats and slightly larger than ours in Republican-held seats.

6.4 Independent and third-candidate races

In the 8 races with an independent in a major party's place or a third principal candidate, our Brier score was 0.1031, 2nd of the 7 all-office sources (Table 17). Only On Point Politics was better. These races were the reason the model freeze was lifted on October 5, and the rules adopted then did not cost accuracy. With 8 races the result is consistent with luck.

6.5 The error was mostly one shared miss




Figure 9. Calibration. Left: share of races the Republican lost against the forecast probability, 485 races, all-office sources (ours in black, other models in grey). Right: our forecast on the 471-race two-party panel as published and after moving every center by the realized mean error.

Moving every one of our centers by the realized mean error of 6.5 points, and nothing else, lowers the Brier score on the two-party panel from 0.0538 to 0.0375, the wrong calls from 35 to 22 and the margin MAE to 4.90 points. A separate shift for each office does no better (0.0378), because the three offices missed by nearly the same amount. With the shift removed, the 80% intervals cover 83% of results and the 95% intervals 97%.

This is a statement about the structure of the error. It is a strength only in a limited sense: what remained after the shared miss was sound and unremarkable. Figure 2 made the comparison with other sources, where the same correction leaves us 5th of 7.

6.6 Certainty where it was claimed

Of the 205 races where we gave the favorite 99% or more, none was lost. Of the 360 at 95% or more, four were lost or are trailing, 1.1% against a mean stated risk of 1.1%. Two of those four are uncalled races with margins under 0.2 points. Among the other sources the count of such races lost ranged from 1 to 5. Our safe calls were reliable in absolute terms and average for the field.

6.7 A steady forecast that moved the right way




Figure 10. Accuracy of each day's forecast against the final results, 471 two-party races. The vertical line marks October 6, the first day of issued CTMM 2.2 readings; earlier days are the same method restated on each day's inputs.

The forecast improved through the campaign. Between September 9 and November 3 the pooled Brier score fell from 0.0670 to 0.0538 and the margin MAE from 8.11 to 7.14 points. The House MAE fell on 42 of 55 days. The final edition had the lowest margin MAE of the 56 days and a pooled Brier score within 0.0001 of the best day, November 2. The freeze at noon on November 3 cost nothing measurable. The favorite changed between the first and last reading in 13 of 471 races, and in 11 of those 13 the final favorite won.

Our win probabilities moved steadily toward the result, without large reversals. No time series was captured for the other model forecasters, so this report cannot say whether they moved faster or slower.

6.8 What the first reading already had

The September 9 reading ordered races almost as well as the final one. Its rank correlation with actual margins was 0.9727 against 0.9757 on November 3, and its favorite won in 427 of 471 races against 436 at the end. It favored Democrats to win the House on every one of the 56 days, never below 74%. Democratic control of the Senate was below even odds at the start (43%) and crossed 50% on September 25. Eight weeks is the whole record of this model, and days before October 6 are restated with the current method, so nothing can be said about what the forecast showed months out.

6.9 Candidate strengths that the data does not support

Table 19. Candidate strengths that were tested and did not hold.

Claim tested	What the data shows	Denominator
Better race ordering than the field	Rank correlation of margins 0.9761, 6th of 7; AUC 0.9905, 5th of 7	477 and 485 races
Better race ordering than a baseline in the House	Rank correlation 0.9760 for the model, 0.9731 for the unchanged 2024 presidential margin	411 races
Right when we disagreed with the consensus	Our favorite differed from the other models' mean favorite in 10 races; we were right in 1 (Table 20)	486 races
An office or region where we led on probability	Last on the Brier score in all three offices; behind the other models' mean in all four Census regions	485 races
Accuracy in the most-polled races	Brier 0.1245 against the field mean's 0.0768	30 races with 15 or more polls
Better in races Republicans won	5th of 9	197 races
Ranked-choice races	6th of 7	6 races
A better state-level pattern	Our state mean error was closer to zero than the field's in 7 states	42 states with three or more races
Well-sized race intervals	Our 80% intervals covered 61%; On Point Politics' published 80% intervals, 29% wider than ours, covered 89%	471 and 478 races
Steadiness as skill	Steady movement is not skill on its own, and no time series of the other models was captured to compare it with (section 6.7)	56 days
A forecast that held up from months out	The record of this model is eight weeks	56 days

Table 20. Every race in which our favorite differed from the favorite of the other models' mean probability.

Race	Our P(D)	Other models' mean P(D)	Winner	Margin	Who had the favorite right
SEN-IA	44%	52%	D	D+4.2	the field was
GOV-GA	38%	61%	D	D+8.7	the field was
GOV-NV	30%	59%	D	D+7.6	the field was
GOV-OR	41%	80%	D	D+9.6	the field was
FL-22	46%	55%	D	D+3.8	the field was
IA-03	45%	74%	D	D+7.3	the field was
KY-06	57%	47%	D	D+9.4	we were
MI-10	23%	61%	D	D+7.2	the field was
PA-01	34%	58%	D	D+5.7	the field was
TX-35	49%	60%	D	D+10.9	the field was

7. What failed, in order of cost

Table 21 puts the failures on one scale. Each row changes the published centers in one stated way and rescores the 471-race two-party panel. The rows overlap and do not add up: removing the national shift removes most of what every other row removes. The first two rows are measurements of the miss. The others are counterfactuals for a named mechanism.

Table 21. Cost of each failure: change from the published forecast when it is removed. Negative Brier, wrong-call and MAE changes are improvements. The published forecast scores 0.0538 with 35 wrong calls and an MAE of 7.32 points on this panel.

Counterfactual: what is removed or reversed	Brier	Wrong calls	MAE (points)	Expected D House seats	Expected D Senate seats	Expected D governorships
The whole shared miss (hindsight: every center moved by the realized mean error)	−0.0163	−13	−2.41	+34.5	+3.6	+4.9
Our extra Republican lean relative to the other forecasters' mean, by office	−0.0086	−5	−0.90	+7.2	+0.2	+1.3
The extra error on redrawn House districts	−0.0049	−3	−0.61	+5.6	+0.0	+0.0
The partisan-sponsor adjustment	−0.0046	−2	−0.10	+3.4	−0.0	+0.2
House elasticity 0.31 and the generic-ballot mapping (against elasticity 1, generic ballot at face value)	−0.0046	−3	−1.89	+14.9	+0.0	+0.0
House elasticity 0.31 alone (against elasticity 1, same environment estimate)	−0.0045	−2	−1.72	+11.1	+0.0	+0.0
The poll-bias shift (Senate, governor)	−0.0036	−3	−0.18	+0.0	+1.0	+2.2
The 60-day poll half-life (against 14 days)	−0.0003	+5	−0.00	−1.0	+0.3	+0.8

7.1 The shared miss

Democrats beat our forecast in 85% of races, by 6.5 points on average. That one number is worth 0.0163 of our 0.0538 Brier, 13 of our 35 wrong calls on the panel, and 34 expected House seats.

Most of it was shared with everyone. The other models' mean margin error was −5.1 in the House, −5.0 in the Senate and −3.7 for governors, against our −6.5, −5.4 and −5.5. The inputs explain why no model escaped. The generic ballot said D+8.3 and the House vote is D+14.0. Race polls in the final month were 4.6 points too Republican. A forecast built on those inputs could be right about 2026 only through its uncertainty.

7.2 Our extra Republican lean

Our forecast was more Republican than the other models' mean by 1.5 points in the House, 0.4 in the Senate and 1.7 for governors. Closing that gap, and changing nothing else, would have lowered our Brier score by 0.0086 and removed 5 wrong calls. The whole gap between our Brier score and the other models' mean on this panel is 0.0111. Most of the distance between us and the middle of the field is therefore level, and the mechanisms below are where the level came from.

7.3 The House elasticity and the generic-ballot mapping

In seats this was the largest single mechanism. The mapping lowered the generic ballot from D+8.32 to D+7.11, and the elasticity of 0.31 passed less than a third of the environment's distance from its reference into unpolled districts. With an elasticity of one and the generic ballot at face value, expected Democratic House seats would have been 251 in place of 236, and the House Brier score 0.0456 in place of 0.0509. That counterfactual is nearly the uniform-swing baseline of section 4, which is why the baseline matched the model. As section 5.3 said, the same change would have hurt in each of the four previous cycles.

7.4 Redrawn districts

The 158 House districts redrawn since 2024 missed by 8.27 points on average against 5.57 for the 253 with unchanged lines, a difference of 2.70 points with a state-clustered standard error of 1.28. Removing the extra error is worth 0.0049 Brier and 5.6 expected seats. This failure was shared: the other models' mean error was 6.53 points on redrawn districts and 4.13 on the rest, a difference of 2.40. New lines were harder for every forecaster.

7.5 Three poll adjustments

The partisan-sponsor adjustment cost 0.0046 Brier on the pooled panel and 3.4 expected House seats. The poll-bias shift cost 0.0036 pooled, concentrated in 60 statewide races where it raised the Brier score by more than half, and it cost 1.0 expected Senate seat and 2.2 governorships. The 60-day half-life cost the Senate 0.0075 Brier and nothing in aggregate. Section 5.4 gave the mechanisms. All three were fitted or chosen on past cycles in which polls more often overstated Democrats.

7.6 Wrong calls and thinly polled House races




Figure 12. Races in which each source's favorite lost or trails, of 485 races, leaders hold. A forecast of exactly 50% counts as half.

Of our 36 wrong calls, 27 were also wrong for the other models' mean and 16 were missed by every model that forecast the race. Three were ours alone among the models (GOV-OR, IA-03, TX-35).




Figure 13. The 18 races with the largest Brier excess over the mean of the other models, of 486 scored races. A Democrat won or leads all 18. An asterisk marks a race that is not yet called.

Table 22. The 15 costliest races relative to the mean of the other models. The top 10 hold 49% of our total excess of 5.32 Brier points summed over 486 races, and the top 25 hold 85%.

Race	Our rating	Our P(D)	Other models' mean P(D)	Brier excess over the field mean	Our margin error	Field margin error	Race polls
MI-10	Lean R	23%	61%	0.437	−11.4	−5.4	2
GOV-NV	Lean R	30%	59%	0.323	−10.5	−5.9	15
GOV-OR	Tilt R	41%	80%	0.307	−10.9	−2.7	6
MI-04	Lean R	26%	46%	0.260	−5.1	−2.8	5
PA-01	Tilt R	34%	58%	0.256	−7.8	−4.6	8
IA-03	Tilt R	45%	74%	0.235	−7.9	−3.1	1
GOV-GA	Tilt R	38%	61%	0.231	−10.6	−6.8	20
GOV-TX	Lean R	21%	35%	0.197	−11.7	−10.1	65
NJ-02	Likely R	5%	15%	0.187	−12.4	−9.7	1
TX-23	Lean R	27%	40%	0.182	−11.9	−9.8	2
FL-25	Tilt D	51%	75%	0.177	−4.4	−0.5	4
NC-13	Likely R	5%	15%	0.176	−12.3	−9.6	0
FL-09	Lean R	28%	40%	0.155	−3.6	−2.0	2
CO-04*	Lean R	16%	26%	0.146	−6.1	−5.5	1
SEN-SC	Lean R	25%	35%	0.142	−8.3	−6.5	18

The costliest races are lean and tilt Republican calls that Democrats won, and thinly polled House districts are over-represented. The 104 races with one to four polls account for 2.44 of the 5.32 excess, where the 311 unpolled races account for 0.28. One or two polls, most of them from Democratic sponsors and each read two points more Republican by the sponsor rule, were given most of the weight in a race. The backtest's single-poll weight cap addresses this and is among the few fixes that passed (section 9).

7.7 Interval coverage




Figure 14. Share of results in each band of our forecast distribution against the share expected from a calibrated forecast: 29 Senate, 31 governor and 411 House races.

Table 23. Coverage of our two-party intervals, as published and after removing each office's mean error.

Office	Races	50%	80%	95%	Result above the 80% interval (more Democratic)	Below	Mean error removed	50% after	80% after	95% after	Mean 80% width (points)
Senate	29	34%	69%	100%	31%	0%	−5.5	69%	97%	100%	18.8
Governor	31	35%	71%	100%	29%	0%	−5.5	65%	94%	100%	16.3
House	411	33%	59%	89%	40%	1%	−6.6	47%	82%	97%	16.2
All three	471	33%	61%	90%	39%	1%	−6.5	49%	83%	97%	16.4

The 80% intervals covered 61% of results and the 50% intervals 33%. Of all results, 39% were above the 80% interval and 0.8% below. The Senate and governor 95% intervals covered every race, and the House 95% intervals 89%. This is the race-level face of section 5.9: the intervals put too little of their width into error shared across races.

8. Error anatomy




Figure 15. Distribution of our margin errors (forecast minus actual two-party margin): 29 Senate, 31 governor and 411 House races. Red bars: forecast too Republican. Blue bars: too Democratic. The black line is the mean.

The forecast was too Republican in 93% of Senate races, 87% of governor races and 84% of House races.

8.1 Variance decomposition




Figure 16. Decomposition of the mean squared margin error, 471 races in 49 states (two-party panel, leaders hold).

The mean squared error is split into four parts: the square of the overall mean error; the spread of the three office means around it; a state component estimated by one-way random-effects analysis of variance on office-centered errors, which removes the race-level noise that averages into small states' means; and the race-level remainder.

Table 24. Variance decomposition of margin error under three definitions.

Panel	Races	RMSE (points)	Mean error	One national shift	Office differences	State effects	Race-level residual	State SD (points)	Race SD (points)
Two-party margins, leaders hold	471	8.96	−6.47	51.7%	0.2%	13.5%	34.5%	3.31	5.28
Two-party margins, called races only	460	8.97	−6.45	51.4%	0.2%	13.3%	35.2%	3.28	5.33
All-vote headline margins, leaders hold	471	8.75	−6.38	52.8%	0.2%	13.4%	33.6%	3.21	5.09

One national shift is 52% of the squared error. The offices differ by almost nothing once the national shift is removed (0.2%): the Senate, governor and House means are −5.5, −5.5 and −6.6. State effects are 14%, a standard deviation of 3.3 points from state to state. The race-level remainder is 35%, a standard deviation of 5.3 points. The split barely changes on called races alone or on all-vote margins.

8.2 States and regions




Figure 17. Left: our mean signed margin error by state (all-vote, points; red means the forecast was too Republican), 471 races. Alaska has no race in the panel. Right: our state mean error against the mean of the other models for the 42 states with three or more races; marker area grows with the number of races.

The state pattern was common to the field. Across the 42 states with three or more races, the correlation between our state mean error and the other models' is 0.90, and at race level the correlation of errors is 0.81 over 471 races. The largest misses were in the South, where our mean error was −8.1 points over 182 races and the field's −7.0. In the other three regions our mean error was between −5.1 and −5.4 and the field's between −3.2 and −4.2. Appendix C lists every state.

8.3 By race characteristics




Figure 18. Mean signed margin error by group, ours and the mean of the other model forecasters (all-vote margins; negative means too Republican). The number of races in each group is printed at the right.

Table 25. Error by group: margins on the races where the other models also published a margin, and probabilities on scored races.

Split	Group	Margin races	Our mean error	Our MAE	Field mean error	Field MAE	Probability races	Our Brier	Field Brier	Our wrong calls	Field wrong calls
Office	Senate	29	−5.4	6.49	−5.0	5.61	35	0.0785	0.0610	3	2
	Governor	31	−5.5	6.02	−3.7	4.40	36	0.0767	0.0433	5	2
	House	411	−6.5	7.30	−5.1	6.07	415	0.0507	0.0423	28	24
Census region	Midwest	105	−5.4	6.29	−4.2	4.89	107	0.0632	0.0471	11	8
	Northeast	81	−5.4	6.30	−3.7	4.98	83	0.0309	0.0210	2	1
	South	182	−8.1	8.34	−7.0	7.07	185	0.0728	0.0642	18	16
	West	103	−5.1	6.66	−3.2	5.71	111	0.0337	0.0232	5	3
Absolute forecast margin (points)	0-5	69	−5.6	5.79	−4.3	4.41	72	0.2217	0.1561	24	16
	5-10	47	−7.1	7.30	−7.1	7.14	48	0.1421	0.1291	8	8
	10-20	125	−6.3	7.17	−5.9	6.58	128	0.0283	0.0289	4	4
	20+	230	−6.5	7.55	−4.2	5.79	238	0.0006	0.0004	0	0
Seat held by	Democrat	224	−6.8	7.64	−3.2	4.83	227	0.0194	0.0130	7	4
	Republican	247	−6.0	6.74	−6.5	6.92	259	0.0855	0.0706	29	24
Incumbent	D incumbent	183	−6.3	7.19	−2.9	4.61	184	0.0114	0.0064	3	2
	Open or other	103	−7.2	7.76	−5.5	6.33	108	0.0663	0.0500	11	7
	R incumbent	185	−6.0	6.81	−6.7	7.01	194	0.0891	0.0755	22	19
2024 presidential margin	R+20 or more	142	−5.6	6.86	−7.1	7.63	150	0.0130	0.0135	2	2
	R+10 to R+20	77	−6.7	6.72	−6.5	6.49	81	0.1982	0.1752	22	20
	R+3 to R+10	27	−5.7	5.95	−4.6	4.64	27	0.2243	0.1489	9	6
	within 3	30	−8.2	8.28	−5.9	6.14	30	0.0599	0.0254	2	0
	D+3 to D+10	42	−6.3	7.07	−4.1	5.24	43	0.0065	0.0023	0	0
	D+10 to D+20	51	−4.4	6.40	−1.3	4.07	52	0.0068	0.0009	1	0
	D+20 or more	102	−7.9	8.34	−2.8	4.63	103	0.0005	0.0008	0	0
Race polls in the edition	0	307	−6.6	7.54	−4.9	6.15	311	0.0127	0.0118	4	4
	1-4	102	−5.9	6.70	−5.5	6.13	104	0.1317	0.1083	20	16
	5-14	36	−5.7	5.89	−4.7	4.77	41	0.1259	0.0974	7	6
	15+	26	−6.2	6.38	−4.0	4.18	30	0.1245	0.0768	5	2
House district lines	Unchanged since 2024	253	−5.5	6.50	−4.1	5.33	255	0.0386	0.0295	13	11
	Redrawn since 2024	158	−8.2	8.57	−6.5	7.25	160	0.0700	0.0626	15	13

Four patterns stand out. First, the party holding the seat. Our error was similar in Democratic-held and Republican-held seats (−6.8 and −6.0), where the field's was −3.2 and −6.5. The same shows in seats that voted Democratic for president by 20 points or more: −7.9 for us and −2.8 for the field over 102 races. These are safe seats and cost almost nothing in probability terms, and they are a large part of our margin MAE deficit.

Second, competitiveness. In the 72 races we had within five points our Brier score was 0.222 against the field mean's 0.156, with 24 wrong calls against 16. That band holds 89% of our total excess over the field. Beyond ten points the two are equal.

Third, polling volume. Our margin error did not shrink with more polls: −6.6 with none and −6.2 with 15 or more. The field's did, to −4.0. The heavily polled races are the Senate and governor races where the poll-bias shift applied.

Fourth, redrawn House lines, covered in section 7.4.

Incumbency shows no pattern of its own beyond the party holding the seat. Open seats missed by a little more (−7.2).

9. Counterfactuals and backtests

The first postmortem proposed fixes and then backtested them under a protocol committed before any result was read (`BACKTEST.md`). Each fix was fitted on cycles before each test cycle and scored at election eve on the House in 2018 to 2024 and on the Senate and governors in 2012 to 2024, then applied to 2026 as one more held-out cycle. Its numbers are on the November 7 results snapshot and are quoted here as that document reports them.




Figure 19. Each backtested fix by office: change in MAE over held-out past cycles (4 House cycles, 7 Senate and governor cycles) against change in MAE in 2026. Shaded: worse than the model as run in past cycles. Source: backtest-data/verdicts.json from the first postmortem.

Table 26. The backtested fixes. Changes are the variant minus the model as run; negative is better. The last column is the recommendation BACKTEST.md reached under its preregistered rule.

Fix	Office	Past MAE change	Past Brier change	Past cycles with lower MAE	2026 MAE change	2026 Brier change	Verdict in BACKTEST.md
Remove the poll-bias shift	Senate	+0.13	−0.0019	2 of 7	−1.02	−0.0210	Overfit risk
Remove the poll-bias shift	Governor	+0.35	+0.0074	2 of 7	−1.59	−0.0350	Overfit risk
Regime-aware poll-bias shift	Senate	+0.26	+0.0008	2 of 7	−1.84	−0.0327	Overfit risk
Regime-aware poll-bias shift	Governor	+0.25	+0.0112	3 of 7	−2.08	−0.0438	Overfit risk
House prior relative to the national margin, proxy environment	House	+0.97	+0.0033	1 of 4	−0.04	+0.0007	Reject
House prior relative to the national margin, regime environment	House	+0.70	−0.0020	1 of 4	−2.05	−0.0068	Overfit risk
Regime generic-ballot environment	Senate	+0.17	+0.0003	2 of 7	−0.15	+0.0002	Reject
Regime generic-ballot environment	Governor	−0.00	−0.0000	2 of 7	−0.06	+0.0000	No measurable effect
Uncertainty re-split (shared and race-specific)	House	+0.00	−0.0003	centers unchanged	+0.00	−0.0005	Adopt
Uncertainty re-split (shared and race-specific)	Senate	+0.00	+0.0008	centers unchanged	+0.00	−0.0035	Neutral; 2026 gain only
Uncertainty re-split (shared and race-specific)	Governor	+0.00	+0.0017	centers unchanged	+0.00	+0.0002	Reject
Shorter poll half-life near the election	House	−0.02	−0.0005	2 of 4	+0.00	+0.0000	Adopt (small)
Shorter poll half-life near the election	Senate	−0.04	+0.0002	1 of 7	+0.00	+0.0000	Adopt (small)
Shorter poll half-life near the election	Governor	−0.09	+0.0003	2 of 7	+0.04	−0.0014	Adopt (small)
Single-poll weight cap	House	−0.00	−0.0002	3 of 4	−0.00	−0.0002	Adopt
Single-poll weight cap	Senate	−0.08	−0.0000	3 of 7	+0.00	+0.0000	Adopt
Single-poll weight cap	Governor	−0.12	+0.0000	4 of 7	+0.00	+0.0000	Adopt
No sponsor adjustment	House	+0.01	+0.0001	1 of 4	−0.11	−0.0048	Neutral; 2026 gain only
No sponsor adjustment	Senate	+0.00	+0.0000	1 of 7	−0.04	+0.0010	Neutral; 2026 gain only
No sponsor adjustment	Governor	+0.01	−0.0011	1 of 7	+0.02	−0.0045	Adopt (marginal)
Governor safe-seat evidence term	Governor	+0.12	+0.0005	2 of 7	−0.06	−0.0043	Overfit risk
Full combination	House	+0.70	−0.0005	1 of 4	−2.05	−0.0066	Overfit risk
Full combination	Senate	+0.24	−0.0004	1 of 7	−1.14	−0.0257	Overfit risk
Full combination	Governor	+0.26	+0.0064	4 of 7	−1.79	−0.0318	Overfit risk

The result is plain. Every fix that would have repaired 2026 fails the earlier cycles, and every fix that passes the earlier cycles barely moves 2026.

Removing the poll-bias shift improves 2026 by 1.02 points of Senate MAE and 1.59 of governor MAE, and costs 0.13 and 0.35 points over the seven earlier cycles, where removal lowers MAE in 2 of 7 Senate cycles and 2 of 7 governor cycles. A regime-aware version does worse in the past than plain removal. Re-specifying the House prior so that the environment carries the national level improves the 2026 House MAE by 2.05 points and worsens the four earlier cycles by 0.70. BACKTEST.md reports that the same re-specification fails the earlier cycles even when it is handed the realized national vote.

The fixes that pass are small: a cap on the weight of a single poll, a shorter half-life near the election, a re-split of House uncertainty into shared and race-specific parts, and dropping the sponsor adjustment for governors. BACKTEST.md re-scored 2026 with that adopted set and found that it would still have ranked last or next to last in every chamber. The set that would have ranked mid-pack is the set that fails 2012 to 2024.

The ablations in section 5 agree with this from a different direction. The poll-bias shift lowered MAE in 3 of 7 past governor cycles. The sponsor adjustment and the half-life were neutral or mildly helpful before 2026. Both lines of evidence say the same thing: the model's Republican-leaning corrections were reasonable bets on the record through 2024 and lost in 2026, and that one election does not show they will lose again.

A second backtest covers two further fixes: a zero-mean poll-bias term carried as shared uncertainty, and a prior for redrawn House districts. It was not finished when this report was built, so its verdicts are not cited here.

10. Limitations

One election is one draw of a correlated outcome. The races share a national error, so 486 races are far fewer than 486 independent tests. The state-clustered intervals in this report are narrower than the true uncertainty about any general claim. A single cycle can show that this forecast was the least accurate of those captured. It cannot show that the model is worse than the others in general, and it cannot show that any component is harmful in general.

Counts are not final. 22 races are uncalled, 8 of them within a point, and only 202 of 481 called races are at 98% counted or more. Ranks were stable across the treatments in section 3.2. Levels will move, and margins in slow-counting states will move most.

The comparison set is what was captured. Twelve other models were captured on one day, and the prediction markets captured with them are not ranked. Forecasters that were not captured are not ranked. The other sources' final captures are from about 22:40 UTC, five and a half hours after our freeze, though the first postmortem found no change in ranks at a common cutoff. The mean of other forecasters used as a benchmark changes membership from race to race, because sources cover different races.

The baselines' probability widths rest on six cycles. A different window would change their Brier scores somewhat and would not change their margin errors.

The ablations hold the post-stack calibration and the published intervals fixed, and they score with a normal approximation. They isolate the effect of a component on the center. They do not measure what a fully refitted model without the component would have published for its intervals. The past-cycle column is rolling-origin, and the components were still chosen by people who had seen those cycles.

The environment and elasticity counterfactuals are arithmetic on the published parts. They are not refits.

The trajectory before October 6 is restated with the current method on each day's inputs. The published forecast on those days came from the same model family with earlier settings.

The independent, ranked-choice and runoff groups have between 6 and 26 races each. Nothing in section 5.8 or 6.4 is distinguishable from chance.

Silver Bulletin's scores come from its subscriber forecasts as captured on November 3; its race-by-race numbers are not printed.

11. Conclusions

The final forecast was the least accurate probability forecast of the seven all-office sources, under every treatment of the uncalled races. Its probabilities leaned further toward Republicans, on average, than those of any other all-office source (6.7 points of mean win probability), in a year when every forecaster was too Republican.

About half of the squared error was one national shift that no captured forecaster avoided. Our distance from the middle of the field was mostly level as well: 1.5 points of extra Republican lean in the House and 1.7 in governor races. The components that produced it are identified: a House elasticity of 0.31, a generic-ballot mapping that lowered a D+8.3 reading, a poll-bias shift of 1.6 to 2.5 points toward Republicans, a sponsor rule that pushed Democratic-sponsored House polls further from the result, and a long poll half-life.

The House model added nothing measurable in 2026 over presidential lean plus the generic ballot. The Senate model added a great deal over every baseline, and the governor model added accuracy on margins.

The forecast's statements about chambers were sound as probability statements. The seat results fell inside the 95% intervals and at the edge of the 80% intervals, because the joint simulation carried a shared error of about the size that occurred. The forecast improved steadily for eight weeks, and its final edition was its most accurate on margins.

No fix that repairs 2026 has passed the earlier cycles. The small fixes that passed should be adopted on their merits. The larger questions, a zero-mean poll-bias term carried as shared uncertainty and a prior for redrawn districts, are being backtested separately, and the 2026 result should count in those tests as one cycle among the others.

12. About this report

Call the Map prepared this report about its own forecast. Four things about it should be kept in mind.

It is provisional. 22 of the 506 races are not yet called, 8 of them within a point, and two Louisiana seats go to runoffs on December 12. Every number here will be rebuilt when the results are certified, and some will move.

The other forecasters are scored from what was captured from their public pages on November 3, with each one's own definitions of margin and interval, some of them derived here from vote shares. Appendix C lists every source with its capture time. A forecaster who reads its own numbers differently is the authority on its own forecast.

Silver Bulletin is scored like every other forecaster, from its subscriber forecasts as we captured them on November 3. Its race-by-race numbers are not ours to redistribute, so the report prints its scores and none of its race-by-race probabilities or margins. Prediction markets are not ranked: they are prices, not forecasts.

The unflattering findings are stated as plainly as the favorable ones. The House model did not beat a two-line baseline, and we were right in 1 of 10 disagreements with the consensus of the other forecasters.

Appendix A. Race-level results

Table A1. Races not called at the pinned commit, with the leader that the headline scores assign as the outcome.

Race	Leader	Current margin (D minus R)	Our P(Republican loses)	Note
GOV-AK	D	D+21.4	87%	
AK-AL	R	n/a	35%	
AZ-02	R	R+1.0	25%	
CA-04	D	n/a	100%	no Republican-versus-other contest; not scored
CA-23	R	R+1.6	3%	
CA-40	R	n/a	0%	no Republican-versus-other contest; not scored
CO-04	D	D+0.9	16%	
FL-10	D	n/a	100%	no Republican-versus-other contest; not scored
FL-27	R	R+0.4	19%	
LA-05	D	D+0.7	1%	runoff December 12; excluded
LA-06	D	D+0.3	1%	runoff December 12; excluded
MA-02	D	n/a	100%	no Republican-versus-other contest; not scored
MA-05	D	n/a	100%	no Republican-versus-other contest; not scored
MA-07	D	n/a	100%	no Republican-versus-other contest; not scored
MN-01	D	D+0.1	39%	
NC-03	D	D+0.1	12%	
NC-05	D	D+0.1	4%	
NC-07	R	R+0.7	7%	
NC-10	R	R+0.8	3%	
TN-04	D	D+0.1	1%	
WA-05	R	R+4.4	12%	
SEN-AK	D	D+2.3	51%	

Table A2. Every forecast race. P(Republican loses) is one minus our published P(Republican wins). Margins are all-vote, Democratic minus Republican, as published on the site; in races without a Democrat-versus-Republican pairing the actual margin is not defined on this basis. Error is forecast minus actual. The call is a hit when the side we gave more than 50% won or leads.

Race	Rating	P(Republican loses)	Forecast margin	80% interval	Actual margin	Error	In 80%	Winner	Call
SEN-AK	n/a	51.5%	D+0.9	n/a	D+2.3	−1.4		D leads	hit
SEN-AL	Solid R	0.7%	R+18.5	R+26.7 to R+10.3	R+9.5	−9.0	out	R	hit
SEN-AR	Solid R	4.8%	R+12.4	R+21.6 to R+3.2	R+11.8	−0.6	in	R	hit
SEN-CO	Solid D	99.6%	D+20.3	D+12.2 to D+28.4	D+25.5	−5.2	in	D	hit
SEN-DE	Solid D	99.5%	D+32.8	D+19.4 to D+46.2	D+27.2	+5.6	in	D	hit
SEN-FL	Likely R	7.1%	R+8.5	R+15.8 to R+1.2	R+2.9	−5.7	in	R	hit
SEN-GA	Likely D	92.8%	D+8.6	D+1.2 to D+16.0	D+18.1	−9.4	out	D	hit
SEN-IA	Tilt R	44.4%	R+0.8	R+8.3 to D+6.8	D+4.2	−5.0	in	D	miss
SEN-ID	n/a	8.7%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		R	hit
SEN-IL	Solid D	97.3%	D+13.5	D+5.1 to D+21.9	D+25.3	−11.8	out	D	hit
SEN-KS	Tilt D	61.9%	D+1.7	R+5.8 to D+9.1	D+5.1	−3.4	in	D	hit
SEN-KY	Solid R	7.1%	R+13.8	R+25.7 to R+2.0	R+12.1	−1.8	in	R	hit
SEN-LA	Likely R	8.0%	R+12.3	R+23.5 to R+1.2	R+1.8	−10.6	in	R	hit
SEN-MA	Solid D	100.0%	D+29.9	D+22.2 to D+37.7	D+31.3	−1.3	in	D	hit
SEN-ME	Tilt D	61.3%	D+1.6	R+6.1 to D+9.4	D+6.1	−4.5	in	D	hit
SEN-MI	Tilt D	66.5%	D+2.4	R+5.2 to D+9.9	D+7.0	−4.6	in	D	hit
SEN-MN	Lean D	75.1%	D+3.7	R+3.6 to D+11.0	D+10.2	−6.5	in	D	hit
SEN-MS	n/a	15.2%	R+9.0	n/a	D+0.8	−9.7		D	miss
SEN-MT	n/a	6.0%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		R	hit

Race	Rating	P(Republican loses)	Forecast margin	80% interval	Actual margin	Error	In 80%	Winner	Call
SEN-NC	Likely D	94.5%	D+9.2	D+2.1 to D+16.4	D+19.7	−10.5	out	D	hit
SEN-NE	n/a	30.0%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		R	hit
SEN-NH	Lean D	84.7%	D+5.7	R+1.6 to D+13.1	D+13.8	−8.0	out	D	hit
SEN-NJ	Solid D	99.2%	D+24.7	D+13.4 to D+36.1	D+27.5	−2.8	in	D	hit
SEN-NM	Solid D	99.3%	D+18.0	D+10.1 to D+25.9	D+26.5	−8.5	out	D	hit
SEN-OH	Tilt D	61.8%	D+1.7	R+5.9 to D+9.3	D+4.9	−3.2	in	D	hit
SEN-OK	Solid R	0.8%	R+22.4	R+32.7 to R+12.2	R+17.9	−4.5	in	R	hit
SEN-OR	Solid D	99.5%	D+29.9	D+17.5 to D+42.3	D+19.4	+10.5	in	D	hit
SEN-RI	Solid D	99.9%	D+30.8	D+22.0 to D+39.7	D+37.5	−6.7	in	D	hit
SEN-SC	Lean R	25.2%	R+3.8	R+11.3 to D+3.8	D+4.5	−8.3	out	D	miss
SEN-SD	n/a	1.3%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		R	hit
SEN-TN	Solid R	0.3%	R+25.4	R+34.8 to R+16.0	R+12.2	−13.2	out	R	hit
SEN-TX	Tilt D	60.2%	D+1.5	R+6.2 to D+9.1	D+12.1	−10.6	out	D	hit
SEN-VA	Solid D	99.1%	D+23.2	D+12.3 to D+34.1	D+23.5	−0.3	in	D	hit
SEN-WV	Solid R	0.4%	R+34.5	R+48.2 to R+20.8	R+20.3	−14.2	out	R	hit
SEN-WY	Solid R	0.5%	R+32.4	R+45.7 to R+19.1	R+30.3	−2.1	in	R	hit
GOV-AK	n/a	86.7%	D+20.0	n/a	D+21.4	−1.5		D leads	hit
GOV-AL	Solid R	4.0%	R+12.6	R+21.3 to R+3.9	R+3.9	−8.7	in	R	hit
GOV-AR	Solid R	1.3%	R+18.4	R+26.5 to R+10.4	R+15.3	−3.1	in	R	hit
GOV-AZ	Lean D	89.0%	D+7.0	R+0.1 to D+14.2	D+13.2	−6.2	in	D	hit
GOV-CA	Solid D	99.0%	D+23.8	D+15.3 to D+32.2	D+31.2	−7.4	in	D	hit
GOV-CO	Solid D	98.4%	D+17.4	D+8.8 to D+26.1	D+27.9	−10.5	out	D	hit
GOV-CT	Solid D	98.7%	D+17.9	D+10.6 to D+25.3	D+19.2	−1.2	in	D	hit
GOV-FL	Lean R	14.8%	R+6.8	R+15.1 to D+1.5	R+1.3	−5.5	in	R	hit
GOV-GA	Tilt R	38.3%	R+2.0	R+10.3 to D+6.3	D+8.7	−10.6	out	D	miss
GOV-HI	Solid D	99.7%	D+38.1	D+28.0 to D+48.2	D+45.3	−7.2	in	D	hit
GOV-IA	Lean D	84.8%	D+6.7	R+1.6 to D+15.0	D+11.1	−4.4	in	D	hit
GOV-ID	n/a	1.1%	R+21.3	n/a	R+24.7	+3.4		R	hit
GOV-IL	Solid D	98.9%	D+21.0	D+13.4 to D+28.7	D+24.6	−3.6	in	D	hit
GOV-KS	Lean R	32.0%	R+3.0	R+11.3 to D+5.3	D+0.7	−3.7	in	D	miss
GOV-MA	Solid D	99.2%	D+25.2	D+17.9 to D+32.6	D+27.3	−2.0	in	D	hit
GOV-MD	Solid D	99.4%	D+30.0	D+21.7 to D+38.3	D+33.7	−3.7	in	D	hit
GOV-ME	n/a	93.9%	D+10.1	n/a	D+16.9	−6.8		D	hit
GOV-MI	Lean D	87.3%	D+7.3	R+0.9 to D+15.4	D+10.7	−3.5	in	D	hit
GOV-MN	Likely D	92.8%	D+9.5	D+1.4 to D+17.7	D+12.9	−3.3	in	D	hit
GOV-NE	Lean R	10.3%	R+7.2	R+14.3 to R+0.1	R+8.0	+0.8	in	R	hit
GOV-NH	Likely R	3.1%	R+11.8	R+18.9 to R+4.6	R+4.4	−7.3	out	R	hit
GOV-NM	Lean D	84.0%	D+6.6	R+1.9 to D+15.2	D+14.7	−8.1	in	D	hit
GOV-NV	Lean R	29.8%	R+3.0	R+10.0 to D+4.1	D+7.6	−10.5	out	D	miss
GOV-NY	Likely D	96.6%	D+11.7	D+4.4 to D+19.0	D+19.9	−8.2	out	D	hit
GOV-OH	Tilt D	62.4%	D+2.0	R+6.2 to D+10.1	D+7.9	−6.0	in	D	hit
GOV-OK	Likely R	10.5%	R+8.9	R+17.9 to D+0.1	R+6.0	−2.9	in	R	hit
GOV-OR	Tilt R	40.9%	R+1.4	R+8.8 to D+6.1	D+9.6	−10.9	out	D	miss
GOV-PA	Solid D	99.1%	D+23.3	D+16.1 to D+30.5	D+22.4	+1.0	in	D	hit
GOV-RI	n/a	99.6%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		D	hit
GOV-SC	Solid R	3.0%	R+13.5	R+21.8 to R+5.2	R+4.5	−9.0	out	R	hit
GOV-SD	Solid R	1.1%	R+22.2	R+30.0 to R+14.5	R+27.0	+4.7	in	R	hit
GOV-TN	Solid R	2.0%	R+15.9	R+24.4 to R+7.4	R+2.5	−13.4	out	R	hit
GOV-TX	Lean R	21.3%	R+4.6	R+11.8 to D+2.6	D+7.1	−11.7	out	D	miss
GOV-VT	Lean R	22.9%	R+4.2	R+11.5 to D+3.0	R+6.6	+2.4	in	R	hit
GOV-WI	Lean D	66.9%	D+2.8	R+5.5 to D+11.1	D+8.0	−5.2	in	D	hit
GOV-WY	Solid R	0.6%	R+28.6	R+38.9 to R+18.3	n/a	n/a		R	hit
AK-AL	n/a	35.2%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		R leads	hit
AL-01	Solid R	0.8%	R+25.8	R+34.4 to R+17.2	R+18.1	−7.7	in	R	hit
AL-02	Tilt R	32.3%	R+2.3	R+9.0 to D+4.3	D+7.5	−9.8	out	D	miss
AL-03	Solid R	0.4%	R+37.7	R+46.2 to R+29.2	R+27.9	−9.9	out	R	hit

Race	Rating	P(Republican loses)	Forecast margin	80% interval	Actual margin	Error	In 80%	Winner	Call
AL-04	Solid R	0.1%	R+55.6	R+66.1 to R+45.2	R+49.7	−5.9	in	R	hit
AL-05	Solid R	1.0%	R+22.7	R+30.0 to R+15.4	R+6.5	−16.2	out	R	hit
AL-06	Solid R	0.7%	R+27.7	R+35.4 to R+20.0	R+14.9	−12.8	out	R	hit
AL-07	Solid D	99.1%	D+23.8	D+16.4 to D+31.2	D+38.8	−15.0	out	D	hit
AR-01	Solid R	0.3%	R+38.3	R+46.9 to R+29.7	R+34.4	−3.8	in	R	hit
AR-02	Lean R	22.4%	R+3.9	R+10.6 to D+2.8	R+1.7	−2.2	in	R	hit
AR-03	Solid R	1.0%	R+21.8	R+29.0 to R+14.6	R+13.4	−8.5	out	R	hit
AR-04	Solid R	0.5%	R+34.0	R+42.2 to R+25.8	R+31.0	−3.0	in	R	hit
AZ-01	Lean D	74.7%	D+4.0	R+3.9 to D+11.8	D+7.0	−3.0	in	D	hit
AZ-02	Lean R	25.3%	R+3.5	R+10.3 to D+3.4	R+1.0	−2.4	in	R leads	hit
AZ-03	Solid D	99.8%	D+46.0	D+36.6 to D+55.5	n/a	n/a		D	hit
AZ-04	Solid D	98.5%	D+16.7	D+9.3 to D+24.1	D+27.2	−10.5	out	D	hit
AZ-05	Likely R	7.8%	R+9.2	R+17.5 to R+1.0	R+3.4	−5.9	in	R	hit
AZ-06	Tilt D	65.4%	D+2.2	R+5.0 to D+9.3	D+8.1	−5.9	in	D	hit
AZ-07	Solid D	99.4%	D+31.2	D+23.2 to D+39.2	D+43.9	−12.7	out	D	hit
AZ-08	Likely R	7.4%	R+8.4	R+15.8 to R+1.0	R+2.4	−6.0	in	R	hit
AZ-09	Solid R	1.1%	R+21.7	R+29.1 to R+14.2	R+14.9	−6.7	in	R	hit
CA-01	Solid D	98.3%	D+15.0	D+8.2 to D+21.9	D+14.2	+0.8	in	D	hit
CA-02	Solid D	99.5%	D+33.9	D+25.7 to D+42.2	D+32.3	+1.6	in	D	hit
CA-03	Solid D	98.5%	D+17.9	D+9.4 to D+26.4	D+17.5	+0.4	in	D	hit
CA-04	n/a	100.0%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		D leads	not scored
CA-05	Likely R	2.8%	R+12.4	R+19.9 to R+5.0	R+11.7	−0.7	in	R	hit
CA-06	n/a	100.0%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		D	not scored
CA-07	n/a	100.0%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		D	not scored
CA-08	Solid D	99.8%	D+42.2	D+33.1 to D+51.3	D+46.7	−4.5	in	D	hit
CA-09	Solid D	99.0%	D+22.3	D+14.8 to D+29.8	D+33.9	−11.6	out	D	hit
CA-10	Solid D	99.8%	D+41.8	D+32.8 to D+50.8	D+39.4	+2.4	in	D	hit
CA-11	n/a	100.0%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		D	not scored
CA-12	n/a	100.0%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		D	not scored
CA-13	Solid D	97.4%	D+12.7	D+5.3 to D+20.2	D+24.4	−11.7	out	D	hit
CA-14	n/a	100.0%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		D	not scored
CA-15	Solid D	99.9%	D+54.8	D+44.4 to D+65.2	D+59.8	−5.0	in	D	hit
CA-16	Solid D	99.9%	D+55.0	D+44.6 to D+65.5	D+55.8	−0.8	in	D	hit
CA-17	Solid D	99.8%	D+46.8	D+37.2 to D+56.3	D+45.3	+1.5	in	D	hit
CA-18	Solid D	99.6%	D+37.3	D+28.7 to D+45.8	D+46.3	−9.1	out	D	hit
CA-19	Solid D	99.8%	D+42.5	D+33.4 to D+51.6	D+44.6	−2.1	in	D	hit
CA-20	Solid R	1.0%	R+22.5	R+30.0 to R+15.1	R+22.6	+0.1	in	R	hit
CA-21	Solid D	98.5%	D+17.5	D+10.1 to D+25.0	D+28.1	−10.6	out	D	hit
CA-22	Lean D	89.7%	D+6.9	R+0.1 to D+13.9	D+35.8	−28.9	out	D	hit
CA-23	Likely R	3.5%	R+11.3	R+18.8 to R+3.9	R+1.6	−9.7	out	R leads	hit
CA-24	Solid D	99.5%	D+34.2	D+25.9 to D+42.5	D+32.9	+1.2	in	D	hit
CA-25	Solid D	98.6%	D+17.4	D+9.9 to D+24.8	D+31.6	−14.2	out	D	hit
CA-26	Solid D	98.9%	D+22.4	D+13.8 to D+30.9	D+25.8	−3.5	in	D	hit
CA-27	Solid D	98.9%	D+20.8	D+13.4 to D+28.3	D+28.3	−7.4	in	D	hit
CA-28	Solid D	99.5%	D+34.5	D+26.2 to D+42.8	D+39.1	−4.6	in	D	hit
CA-29	n/a	100.0%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		D	not scored
CA-30	Solid D	99.9%	D+47.6	D+37.9 to D+57.2	D+55.1	−7.6	in	D	hit
CA-31	Solid D	99.0%	D+23.0	D+15.5 to D+30.5	D+32.6	−9.6	out	D	hit
CA-32	Solid D	99.5%	D+34.2	D+25.9 to D+42.5	D+34.5	−0.3	in	D	hit
CA-33	Solid D	98.8%	D+20.9	D+13.4 to D+28.4	D+37.9	−17.0	out	D	hit
CA-34	n/a	100.0%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		D	not scored
CA-35	Solid D	98.7%	D+19.1	D+11.6 to D+26.6	D+34.0	−14.9	out	D	hit
CA-36	Solid D	99.8%	D+46.7	D+37.2 to D+56.2	D+45.9	+0.8	in	D	hit
CA-37	n/a	100.0%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		D	not scored
CA-38	Solid D	98.7%	D+19.8	D+11.3 to D+28.4	D+34.8	−14.9	out	D	hit
CA-39	Solid D	98.9%	D+20.7	D+13.2 to D+28.1	D+36.5	−15.8	out	D	hit

Race	Rating	P(Republican loses)	Forecast margin	80% interval	Actual margin	Error	In 80%	Winner	Call
CA-40	n/a	0.0%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		R leads	not scored
CA-41	Solid D	98.9%	D+21.4	D+12.9 to D+29.9	D+35.0	−13.7	out	D	hit
CA-42	Solid D	99.1%	D+23.8	D+16.3 to D+31.3	D+23.8	+0.1	in	D	hit
CA-43	Solid D	99.9%	D+55.7	D+45.2 to D+66.3	D+65.8	−10.1	in	D	hit
CA-44	Solid D	99.8%	D+43.2	D+34.0 to D+52.3	D+63.4	−20.3	out	D	hit
CA-45	Solid D	98.2%	D+15.8	D+8.3 to D+23.2	D+21.9	−6.2	in	D	hit
CA-46	Solid D	99.2%	D+26.5	D+18.9 to D+34.1	D+43.0	−16.5	out	D	hit
CA-47	Solid D	98.9%	D+21.2	D+13.7 to D+28.6	D+17.1	+4.1	in	D	hit
CA-48	Lean D	84.9%	D+5.9	R+1.5 to D+13.3	D+19.5	−13.6	out	D	hit
CA-49	Solid D	98.9%	D+22.9	D+15.4 to D+30.4	D+18.3	+4.6	in	D	hit
CA-50	Solid D	99.3%	D+28.3	D+20.5 to D+36.1	D+26.8	+1.5	in	D	hit
CA-51	Solid D	99.3%	D+28.3	D+20.5 to D+36.0	D+31.8	−3.6	in	D	hit
CA-52	Solid D	99.2%	D+27.7	D+20.0 to D+35.4	D+43.1	−15.4	out	D	hit
CO-01	Solid D	100.0%	D+57.1	D+45.0 to D+69.2	D+64.2	−7.1	in	D	hit
CO-02	Solid D	99.9%	D+46.6	D+37.2 to D+56.0	D+51.3	−4.7	in	D	hit
CO-03	Tilt R	42.1%	R+1.0	R+7.8 to D+5.8	R+1.8	+0.8	in	R	hit
CO-04	Lean R	16.4%	R+5.2	R+12.1 to D+1.7	D+0.9	−6.1	in	D leads	miss
CO-05	Tilt R	44.6%	R+0.6	R+7.2 to D+5.9	D+4.7	−5.4	in	D	miss
CO-06	Solid D	99.5%	D+30.4	D+22.6 to D+38.2	D+34.6	−4.2	in	D	hit
CO-07	Solid D	99.2%	D+25.8	D+18.4 to D+33.2	D+24.6	+1.2	in	D	hit
CO-08	Lean D	71.2%	D+2.9	R+4.0 to D+9.9	D+14.7	−11.8	out	D	hit
CT-01	Solid D	99.4%	D+32.0	D+22.8 to D+41.1	D+36.3	−4.3	in	D	hit
CT-02	Solid D	98.9%	D+21.8	D+14.6 to D+28.9	D+24.9	−3.1	in	D	hit
CT-03	Solid D	99.2%	D+27.3	D+19.7 to D+34.9	D+25.6	+1.6	in	D	hit
CT-04	Solid D	99.6%	D+34.0	D+25.8 to D+42.3	D+33.1	+1.0	in	D	hit
CT-05	Solid D	98.2%	D+14.6	D+7.4 to D+21.7	D+15.7	−1.1	in	D	hit
DE-AL	Solid D	99.1%	D+24.5	D+17.1 to D+31.9	D+28.7	−4.2	in	D	hit
FL-01	Solid R	0.7%	R+28.9	R+36.7 to R+21.1	R+26.9	−2.1	in	R	hit
FL-02	Likely R	8.6%	R+9.1	R+17.6 to R+0.6	R+4.2	−4.9	in	R	hit
FL-03	Solid R	1.9%	R+14.9	R+22.3 to R+7.5	R+12.1	−2.7	in	R	hit
FL-04	Lean R	11.3%	R+7.0	R+14.4 to D+0.4	R+2.1	−4.9	in	R	hit
FL-05	Solid R	1.7%	R+15.3	R+22.7 to R+7.9	R+12.8	−2.5	in	R	hit
FL-06	Solid R	1.1%	R+22.8	R+30.2 to R+15.3	R+19.0	−3.8	in	R	hit
FL-07	Lean R	32.7%	R+2.7	R+10.8 to D+5.3	R+0.5	−2.2	in	R	hit
FL-08	Likely R	4.7%	R+9.8	R+16.9 to R+2.6	R+6.3	−3.4	in	R	hit
FL-09	Lean R	28.1%	R+3.1	R+10.1 to D+3.9	D+0.5	−3.6	in	D	miss
FL-10	Solid D	100.0%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		D leads	not scored
FL-11	Lean R	22.9%	R+4.6	R+12.7 to D+3.6	R+6.9	+2.3	in	R	hit
FL-12	Likely R	4.8%	R+10.1	R+17.5 to R+2.6	R+6.8	−3.3	in	R	hit
FL-13	Lean R	23.3%	R+3.7	R+10.2 to D+2.9	R+0.8	−2.9	in	R	hit
FL-14	Lean D	81.3%	D+4.8	R+2.2 to D+11.7	D+5.4	−0.6	in	D	hit
FL-15	Solid R	2.1%	R+13.9	R+21.4 to R+6.5	R+8.6	−5.4	in	R	hit
FL-16	Lean R	23.1%	R+4.4	R+12.4 to D+3.5	R+4.2	−0.2	in	R	hit
FL-17	Solid R	1.6%	R+15.8	R+23.2 to R+8.4	R+18.3	+2.5	in	R	hit
FL-18	Likely R	3.5%	R+11.4	R+18.8 to R+4.0	R+3.6	−7.8	out	R	hit
FL-19	Solid R	1.3%	R+19.5	R+28.0 to R+11.0	R+23.5	+3.9	in	R	hit
FL-20	Solid D	99.7%	D+38.8	D+28.8 to D+48.8	D+52.6	−13.8	out	D	hit
FL-21	Likely R	2.8%	R+11.9	R+19.0 to R+4.7	R+9.1	−2.8	in	R	hit
FL-22	Tilt R	45.6%	R+0.7	R+8.7 to D+7.3	D+3.8	−4.5	in	D	miss
FL-23	Solid D	98.5%	D+18.5	D+10.0 to D+26.9	D+31.3	−12.8	out	D	hit
FL-24	Solid D	99.7%	D+40.2	D+30.1 to D+50.3	D+61.2	−21.0	out	D	hit
FL-25	Tilt D	51.2%	D+0.2	R+7.5 to D+8.0	D+4.6	−4.4	in	D	hit
FL-26	Solid R	2.7%	R+12.6	R+20.0 to R+5.2	R+0.7	−11.9	out	R	hit
FL-27	Lean R	18.7%	R+4.7	R+11.7 to D+2.2	R+0.4	−4.3	in	R leads	hit
FL-28	Solid R	1.3%	R+18.8	R+26.2 to R+11.3	R+7.2	−11.5	out	R	hit
GA-01	Likely R	9.6%	R+8.6	R+17.1 to R+0.1	R+2.8	−5.8	in	R	hit

Race	Rating	P(Republican loses)	Forecast margin	80% interval	Actual margin	Error	In 80%	Winner	Call
GA-02	Solid D	98.7%	D+19.1	D+11.7 to D+26.6	D+21.6	−2.5	in	D	hit
GA-03	Solid R	1.6%	R+15.9	R+23.1 to R+8.7	R+17.2	+1.3	in	R	hit
GA-04	Solid D	99.9%	D+55.0	D+44.5 to D+65.4	D+65.3	−10.3	in	D	hit
GA-05	Solid D	100.0%	D+72.1	D+59.5 to D+84.7	D+80.4	−8.3	in	D	hit
GA-06	Solid D	99.9%	D+52.7	D+42.6 to D+62.9	D+61.8	−9.0	in	D	hit
GA-07	Likely R	5.2%	R+9.4	R+16.5 to R+2.3	R+12.4	+3.0	in	R	hit
GA-08	Solid R	1.0%	R+24.0	R+31.5 to R+16.5	R+20.8	−3.2	in	R	hit
GA-09	Solid R	0.8%	R+25.8	R+33.3 to R+18.2	R+18.6	−7.2	in	R	hit
GA-10	Likely R	4.4%	R+11.8	R+20.3 to R+3.3	R+7.3	−4.5	in	R	hit
GA-11	Likely R	7.1%	R+9.5	R+17.7 to R+1.3	R+10.7	+1.2	in	R	hit
GA-12	Likely R	5.0%	R+9.9	R+17.4 to R+2.5	R+4.2	−5.8	in	R	hit
GA-13	Solid D	99.8%	D+43.8	D+33.3 to D+54.3	D+59.7	−15.9	out	D	hit
GA-14	Solid R	1.0%	R+23.8	R+31.3 to R+16.3	R+17.5	−6.2	in	R	hit
HI-01	Solid D	99.7%	D+38.2	D+29.9 to D+46.6	D+48.9	−10.6	out	D	hit
HI-02	Solid D	99.6%	D+33.9	D+26.0 to D+41.7	D+33.0	+0.8	in	D	hit
IA-01	Likely D	93.6%	D+8.6	D+1.6 to D+15.5	D+9.6	−1.0	in	D	hit
IA-02	Tilt D	52.1%	D+0.3	R+7.5 to D+8.1	D+4.0	−3.7	in	D	hit
IA-03	Tilt R	45.2%	R+0.6	R+7.9 to D+6.6	D+7.3	−7.9	out	D	miss
IA-04	Solid R	1.2%	R+20.2	R+28.5 to R+11.8	R+18.1	−2.1	in	R	hit
ID-01	Solid R	0.7%	R+27.2	R+34.0 to R+20.4	R+35.3	+8.1	out	R	hit
ID-02	Solid R	1.3%	R+17.3	R+24.0 to R+10.7	R+11.4	−5.9	in	R	hit
IL-01	Solid D	99.7%	D+39.4	D+30.6 to D+48.2	D+44.8	−5.4	in	D	hit
IL-02	Solid D	99.6%	D+37.8	D+27.9 to D+47.6	D+47.1	−9.3	in	D	hit
IL-03	Solid D	99.7%	D+40.1	D+31.2 to D+49.0	D+54.8	−14.7	out	D	hit
IL-04	Solid D	99.5%	D+32.6	D+23.7 to D+41.4	D+55.3	−22.7	out	D	hit
IL-05	Solid D	99.8%	D+43.8	D+34.6 to D+53.0	D+54.2	−10.4	out	D	hit
IL-06	Solid D	98.6%	D+18.2	D+10.8 to D+25.7	D+25.8	−7.6	out	D	hit
IL-07	Solid D	100.0%	D+65.5	D+52.1 to D+78.8	D+78.6	−13.1	in	D	hit
IL-08	Solid D	98.4%	D+17.6	D+9.1 to D+26.1	D+28.7	−11.0	out	D	hit
IL-09	Solid D	99.7%	D+40.1	D+30.0 to D+50.2	D+53.7	−13.6	out	D	hit
IL-10	Solid D	99.4%	D+30.4	D+22.4 to D+38.3	D+40.7	−10.3	out	D	hit
IL-11	Solid D	99.0%	D+22.1	D+14.6 to D+29.6	D+28.6	−6.5	in	D	hit
IL-12	Solid R	0.5%	R+32.6	R+40.7 to R+24.5	R+39.0	+6.4	in	R	hit
IL-13	Solid D	99.0%	D+23.4	D+15.9 to D+30.9	D+25.4	−2.0	in	D	hit
IL-14	Solid D	98.7%	D+18.7	D+11.3 to D+26.2	D+25.1	−6.4	in	D	hit
IL-15	Solid R	0.7%	R+29.0	R+36.8 to R+21.2	R+33.8	+4.8	in	R	hit
IL-16	Solid R	2.0%	R+14.0	R+21.5 to R+6.6	R+17.6	+3.5	in	R	hit
IL-17	Solid D	98.7%	D+18.0	D+10.6 to D+25.5	D+20.3	−2.3	in	D	hit
IN-01	Solid D	97.4%	D+12.5	D+5.1 to D+19.8	D+25.8	−13.3	out	D	hit
IN-02	Solid R	1.2%	R+19.9	R+27.1 to R+12.6	R+5.0	−14.9	out	R	hit
IN-03	Solid R	0.9%	R+23.9	R+31.1 to R+16.7	R+9.7	−14.1	out	R	hit
IN-04	Solid R	0.9%	R+23.6	R+30.9 to R+16.3	R+8.5	−15.1	out	R	hit
IN-05	Lean R	15.7%	R+5.1	R+11.7 to D+1.5	D+3.3	−8.4	out	D	miss
IN-06	Solid R	0.9%	R+24.5	R+31.8 to R+17.2	R+10.2	−14.3	out	R	hit
IN-07	Solid D	99.8%	D+42.8	D+33.8 to D+51.8	D+56.6	−13.8	out	D	hit
IN-08	Solid R	0.7%	R+28.0	R+35.6 to R+20.4	R+10.5	−17.5	out	R	hit
IN-09	Solid R	1.0%	R+22.7	R+30.0 to R+15.4	R+10.6	−12.1	out	R	hit
KS-01	Solid R	1.0%	R+24.3	R+31.7 to R+16.8	R+21.6	−2.7	in	R	hit
KS-02	Likely R	8.0%	R+7.6	R+14.5 to R+0.7	R+6.2	−1.4	in	R	hit
KS-03	Solid D	98.4%	D+16.6	D+9.3 to D+23.8	D+21.2	−4.6	in	D	hit
KS-04	Solid R	1.4%	R+17.5	R+25.0 to R+10.1	R+9.5	−8.1	out	R	hit
KY-01	Solid R	0.3%	R+38.9	R+47.7 to R+30.2	R+35.1	−3.8	in	R	hit
KY-02	Solid R	0.4%	R+34.8	R+43.1 to R+26.5	R+27.7	−7.1	in	R	hit
KY-03	Solid D	99.2%	D+26.2	D+18.6 to D+33.7	D+40.7	−14.5	out	D	hit
KY-04	Solid R	0.8%	R+25.3	R+33.7 to R+16.9	R+13.4	−11.9	out	R	hit
KY-05	Solid R	0.1%	R+54.8	R+65.2 to R+44.3	R+45.8	−9.0	in	R	hit

Race	Rating	P(Republican loses)	Forecast margin	80% interval	Actual margin	Error	In 80%	Winner	Call
KY-06	Tilt D	56.5%	D+0.9	R+6.4 to D+8.2	D+9.4	−8.5	out	D	hit
LA-01	Solid R	0.6%	R+31.2	R+39.2 to R+23.3	R+26.7	−4.5	in	R	hit
LA-02	Solid D	99.9%	D+50.4	D+40.5 to D+60.3	D+64.8	−14.4	out	D	hit
LA-03	Solid R	0.7%	R+29.4	R+37.2 to R+21.6	R+34.1	+4.7	in	R	hit
LA-04	Solid R	0.7%	R+27.7	R+35.4 to R+20.1	R+35.5	+7.8	out	R	hit
LA-05	Solid R	0.9%	R+24.4	R+33.0 to R+15.9	n/a	n/a		runoff Dec 12	pending
LA-06	Solid R	1.1%	R+22.6	R+31.1 to R+14.1	n/a	n/a		runoff Dec 12	pending
MA-01	Solid D	100.0%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		D	not scored
MA-02	Solid D	100.0%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		D leads	not scored
MA-03	Solid D	99.5%	D+30.9	D+23.1 to D+38.7	D+36.9	−6.0	in	D	hit
MA-04	Solid D	99.5%	D+31.4	D+23.5 to D+39.2	D+32.8	−1.4	in	D	hit
MA-05	Solid D	100.0%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		D leads	not scored
MA-06	Solid D	99.3%	D+28.9	D+20.2 to D+37.5	D+26.8	+2.1	in	D	hit
MA-07	Solid D	100.0%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		D leads	not scored
MA-08	Solid D	99.8%	D+41.1	D+32.4 to D+49.8	D+42.6	−1.5	in	D	hit
MA-09	Solid D	99.1%	D+24.6	D+17.3 to D+31.9	D+21.7	+2.9	in	D	hit
MD-01	Likely R	3.4%	R+10.8	R+17.8 to R+3.7	R+4.9	−5.8	in	R	hit
MD-02	Solid D	99.4%	D+29.7	D+21.9 to D+37.5	D+29.9	−0.2	in	D	hit
MD-03	Solid D	99.5%	D+33.2	D+25.1 to D+41.3	D+35.8	−2.6	in	D	hit
MD-04	Solid D	100.0%	D+78.5	D+64.9 to D+92.0	D+83.2	−4.8	in	D	hit
MD-05	Solid D	99.7%	D+39.7	D+29.7 to D+49.8	D+41.4	−1.7	in	D	hit
MD-06	Solid D	98.8%	D+19.3	D+11.9 to D+26.7	D+20.4	−1.0	in	D	hit
MD-07	Solid D	100.0%	D+65.9	D+54.1 to D+77.6	D+69.7	−3.8	in	D	hit
MD-08	Solid D	100.0%	D+61.6	D+50.5 to D+72.8	D+68.2	−6.6	in	D	hit
ME-01	Solid D	99.3%	D+28.8	D+21.7 to D+35.9	D+32.2	−3.4	in	D	hit
ME-02	Tilt R	45.2%	R+0.7	R+8.0 to D+6.6	R+1.6	+1.0	in	R	hit
MI-01	Solid R	2.2%	R+13.7	R+20.9 to R+6.4	R+9.5	−4.1	in	R	hit
MI-02	Solid R	1.0%	R+22.3	R+29.5 to R+15.0	R+24.5	+2.2	in	R	hit
MI-03	Solid D	98.7%	D+17.6	D+10.3 to D+24.8	D+15.7	+1.9	in	D	hit
MI-04	Lean R	25.8%	R+3.3	R+9.9 to D+3.3	D+1.8	−5.1	in	D	miss
MI-05	Solid R	1.2%	R+20.5	R+27.8 to R+13.2	R+20.6	+0.1	in	R	hit
MI-06	Solid D	99.5%	D+31.3	D+23.4 to D+39.3	D+37.0	−5.7	in	D	hit
MI-07	Lean D	74.5%	D+3.4	R+3.3 to D+10.1	D+3.3	+0.1	in	D	hit
MI-08	Likely D	97.0%	D+11.7	D+4.6 to D+18.9	D+13.6	−1.9	in	D	hit
MI-09	Solid R	0.9%	R+24.6	R+31.9 to R+17.3	R+27.9	+3.3	in	R	hit
MI-10	Lean R	23.2%	R+4.2	R+11.8 to D+3.3	D+7.2	−11.4	out	D	miss
MI-11	Solid D	98.9%	D+21.6	D+13.2 to D+30.0	D+24.0	−2.4	in	D	hit
MI-12	Solid D	99.8%	D+44.2	D+35.1 to D+53.3	D+54.7	−10.5	out	D	hit
MI-13	Solid D	99.8%	D+43.2	D+33.4 to D+52.9	D+56.5	−13.3	out	D	hit
MN-01	Tilt R	38.8%	R+1.4	R+8.0 to D+5.1	D+0.1	−1.5	in	D leads	miss
MN-02	Solid D	97.0%	D+12.6	D+4.7 to D+20.6	D+14.3	−1.6	in	D	hit
MN-03	Solid D	99.3%	D+28.7	D+20.9 to D+36.5	D+28.2	+0.5	in	D	hit
MN-04	Solid D	99.7%	D+41.9	D+32.9 to D+50.9	D+46.3	−4.4	in	D	hit
MN-05	Solid D	100.0%	D+60.0	D+49.0 to D+71.0	D+60.3	−0.3	in	D	hit
MN-06	Solid R	2.5%	R+12.7	R+20.1 to R+5.2	R+11.6	−1.1	in	R	hit
MN-07	Solid R	0.8%	R+25.9	R+33.4 to R+18.5	R+29.9	+3.9	in	R	hit
MN-08	Likely R	8.3%	R+7.6	R+14.6 to R+0.6	R+6.2	−1.4	in	R	hit
MO-01	Solid D	99.9%	D+57.9	D+47.2 to D+68.5	D+67.5	−9.7	in	D	hit
MO-02	Tilt R	44.5%	R+0.7	R+7.1 to D+5.8	D+4.9	−5.6	in	D	miss
MO-03	Solid R	1.3%	R+18.8	R+26.1 to R+11.5	R+8.5	−10.3	out	R	hit
MO-04	Solid R	0.5%	R+32.8	R+40.8 to R+24.7	R+25.9	−6.8	in	R	hit
MO-05	Solid D	99.4%	D+29.2	D+21.5 to D+36.9	D+41.4	−12.2	out	D	hit
MO-06	Solid R	0.7%	R+27.6	R+36.2 to R+18.9	R+19.7	−7.8	in	R	hit
MO-07	Solid R	0.5%	R+33.2	R+41.2 to R+25.1	R+26.8	−6.4	in	R	hit
MO-08	Solid R	0.2%	R+42.1	R+51.1 to R+33.2	R+38.6	−3.6	in	R	hit
MS-01	Solid R	0.6%	R+30.4	R+38.4 to R+22.5	R+17.3	−13.1	out	R	hit

Race	Rating	P(Republican loses)	Forecast margin	80% interval	Actual margin	Error	In 80%	Winner	Call
MS-02	Solid D	99.2%	D+26.7	D+19.0 to D+34.3	D+38.1	−11.5	out	D	hit
MS-03	Solid R	0.9%	R+24.0	R+31.4 to R+16.5	R+15.9	−8.0	out	R	hit
MS-04	Solid R	0.5%	R+36.0	R+44.4 to R+27.6	R+24.7	−11.3	out	R	hit
MT-01	Tilt D	59.5%	D+1.3	R+5.7 to D+8.3	D+3.9	−2.6	in	D	hit
MT-02	Solid R	1.4%	R+17.9	R+24.9 to R+11.0	R+25.8	+7.9	out	R	hit
NC-01	Lean D	72.8%	D+3.0	R+3.4 to D+9.4	D+3.4	−0.4	in	D	hit
NC-02	Solid D	99.7%	D+39.4	D+30.7 to D+48.1	D+51.6	−12.2	out	D	hit
NC-03	Lean R	12.2%	R+6.5	R+13.7 to D+0.7	D+0.1	−6.6	in	D leads	miss
NC-04	Solid D	99.9%	D+49.2	D+39.4 to D+58.9	D+60.2	−11.0	out	D	hit
NC-05	Likely R	3.7%	R+11.0	R+18.4 to R+3.5	D+0.1	−11.1	out	D leads	miss
NC-06	Likely R	4.0%	R+10.7	R+18.0 to R+3.3	D+2.4	−13.1	out	D	miss
NC-07	Likely R	7.3%	R+8.3	R+15.5 to R+1.1	R+0.7	−7.6	out	R leads	hit
NC-08	Likely R	3.0%	R+11.9	R+19.3 to R+4.5	R+1.7	−10.2	out	R	hit
NC-09	Lean R	9.0%	R+7.1	R+13.9 to R+0.4	D+2.3	−9.4	out	D	miss
NC-10	Likely R	3.2%	R+11.3	R+18.6 to R+4.1	R+0.8	−10.5	out	R leads	hit
NC-11	Lean D	80.2%	D+5.0	R+2.6 to D+12.5	D+15.8	−10.9	out	D	hit
NC-12	Solid D	99.9%	D+50.5	D+40.6 to D+60.5	D+62.5	−11.9	out	D	hit
NC-13	Likely R	5.1%	R+9.8	R+17.2 to R+2.4	D+2.5	−12.3	out	D	miss
NC-14	Likely R	7.6%	R+8.4	R+15.8 to R+1.0	D+2.3	−10.7	out	D	miss
ND-AL	Solid R	0.6%	R+27.5	R+34.9 to R+20.0	R+20.7	−6.8	in	R	hit
NE-01	Lean R	21.0%	R+4.2	R+11.0 to D+2.6	R+3.5	−0.7	in	R	hit
NE-02	Likely D	93.9%	D+9.9	D+1.9 to D+17.9	D+15.9	−6.0	in	D	hit
NE-03	Solid R	0.2%	R+43.3	R+52.4 to R+34.3	R+51.1	+7.8	in	R	hit
NH-01	Likely D	92.3%	D+8.5	D+1.0 to D+16.0	D+14.1	−5.6	in	D	hit
NH-02	Solid D	98.6%	D+16.3	D+9.7 to D+22.8	D+20.0	−3.7	in	D	hit
NJ-01	Solid D	99.4%	D+28.5	D+20.8 to D+36.1	D+40.7	−12.3	out	D	hit
NJ-02	Likely R	4.6%	R+9.6	R+16.6 to R+2.7	D+2.7	−12.4	out	D	miss
NJ-03	Solid D	98.9%	D+20.4	D+13.0 to D+27.7	D+27.5	−7.1	in	D	hit
NJ-04	Solid R	1.2%	R+20.3	R+27.7 to R+13.0	R+18.0	−2.4	in	R	hit
NJ-05	Solid D	98.7%	D+18.0	D+10.7 to D+25.4	D+27.9	−9.9	out	D	hit
NJ-06	Solid D	99.0%	D+21.9	D+14.6 to D+29.2	D+38.7	−16.8	out	D	hit
NJ-07	Lean D	78.7%	D+4.3	R+2.7 to D+11.3	D+16.5	−12.2	out	D	hit
NJ-08	Solid D	100.0%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		D	not scored
NJ-09	Solid D	98.2%	D+14.4	D+7.2 to D+21.7	D+34.9	−20.5	out	D	hit
NJ-10	Solid D	99.9%	D+56.3	D+45.8 to D+66.8	D+69.2	−13.0	out	D	hit
NJ-11	Solid D	99.0%	D+22.8	D+15.4 to D+30.1	D+22.5	+0.3	in	D	hit
NJ-12	Solid D	99.4%	D+30.2	D+21.3 to D+39.2	D+42.6	−12.4	out	D	hit
NM-01	Solid D	98.9%	D+21.5	D+14.0 to D+28.9	D+27.3	−5.8	in	D	hit
NM-02	Lean D	86.6%	D+6.0	R+0.9 to D+12.9	D+17.5	−11.5	out	D	hit
NM-03	Solid D	98.4%	D+16.1	D+8.9 to D+23.2	D+23.3	−7.2	out	D	hit
NV-01	Solid D	97.8%	D+13.3	D+6.1 to D+20.6	D+21.5	−8.2	out	D	hit
NV-02	Lean R	26.5%	R+3.7	R+11.6 to D+4.1	D+5.8	−9.6	out	D	miss
NV-03	Lean D	89.6%	D+6.9	R+0.1 to D+13.9	D+21.5	−14.6	out	D	hit
NV-04	Solid D	97.9%	D+13.7	D+6.4 to D+21.0	D+22.7	−9.0	out	D	hit
NY-01	Tilt R	34.1%	R+2.3	R+9.6 to D+5.1	R+2.2	−0.0	in	R	hit
NY-02	Lean R	9.8%	R+7.4	R+14.8 to D+0.0	R+2.3	−5.1	in	R	hit
NY-03	Likely D	97.1%	D+12.1	D+4.7 to D+19.5	D+10.3	+1.8	in	D	hit
NY-04	Solid D	98.1%	D+14.4	D+6.9 to D+21.8	D+13.4	+0.9	in	D	hit
NY-05	Solid D	99.9%	D+49.3	D+39.5 to D+59.0	D+61.2	−12.0	out	D	hit
NY-06	Solid D	99.1%	D+24.2	D+16.8 to D+31.6	D+38.0	−13.8	out	D	hit
NY-07	Solid D	99.9%	D+52.3	D+40.7 to D+63.9	D+68.3	−16.0	out	D	hit
NY-08	Solid D	99.9%	D+52.5	D+42.4 to D+62.7	D+59.3	−6.7	in	D	hit
NY-09	Solid D	99.9%	D+49.8	D+39.9 to D+59.6	D+65.1	−15.3	out	D	hit
NY-10	Solid D	100.0%	D+63.0	D+50.1 to D+76.0	D+67.3	−4.3	in	D	hit
NY-11	Solid R	1.7%	R+15.5	R+22.9 to R+8.1	R+12.3	−3.2	in	R	hit
NY-12	Solid D	100.0%	D+62.6	D+49.7 to D+75.6	D+57.2	+5.5	in	D	hit

Race	Rating	P(Republican loses)	Forecast margin	80% interval	Actual margin	Error	In 80%	Winner	Call
NY-13	Solid D	100.0%	D+62.8	D+49.8 to D+75.8	D+76.2	−13.4	out	D	hit
NY-14	Solid D	99.7%	D+41.6	D+32.6 to D+50.5	D+56.7	−15.1	out	D	hit
NY-15	Solid D	100.0%	D+56.4	D+45.8 to D+67.0	D+66.1	−9.7	in	D	hit
NY-16	Solid D	99.8%	D+44.3	D+35.0 to D+53.6	D+51.8	−7.5	in	D	hit
NY-17	Tilt D	52.2%	D+0.3	R+6.2 to D+6.8	D+6.0	−5.7	in	D	hit
NY-18	Solid D	98.4%	D+16.5	D+9.5 to D+23.5	D+25.8	−9.3	out	D	hit
NY-19	Solid D	98.1%	D+14.6	D+7.1 to D+22.0	D+14.7	−0.1	in	D	hit
NY-20	Solid D	99.2%	D+27.7	D+20.0 to D+35.4	D+27.4	+0.2	in	D	hit
NY-21	Lean R	26.1%	R+3.6	R+11.1 to D+3.8	R+1.8	−1.9	in	R	hit
NY-22	Solid D	98.8%	D+19.9	D+12.4 to D+27.3	D+17.0	+2.9	in	D	hit
NY-23	Solid R	1.4%	R+17.6	R+24.6 to R+10.6	R+20.4	+2.8	in	R	hit
NY-24	Solid R	1.6%	R+16.0	R+23.4 to R+8.6	R+20.7	+4.7	in	R	hit
NY-25	Solid D	99.3%	D+29.5	D+21.7 to D+37.4	D+26.0	+3.5	in	D	hit
NY-26	Solid D	99.5%	D+33.1	D+24.9 to D+41.2	D+32.0	+1.0	in	D	hit
OH-01	Lean D	85.3%	D+5.4	R+1.2 to D+12.0	D+11.4	−6.0	in	D	hit
OH-02	Solid R	0.5%	R+33.6	R+41.8 to R+25.4	R+28.5	−5.1	in	R	hit
OH-03	Solid D	99.8%	D+44.8	D+35.5 to D+54.1	D+54.4	−9.6	out	D	hit
OH-04	Solid R	0.5%	R+34.0	R+42.3 to R+25.8	R+33.2	−0.8	in	R	hit
OH-05	Solid R	1.4%	R+17.4	R+24.9 to R+10.0	R+11.7	−5.7	in	R	hit
OH-06	Solid R	0.8%	R+26.9	R+34.5 to R+19.2	R+20.8	−6.1	in	R	hit
OH-07	Lean D	72.8%	D+2.9	R+3.4 to D+9.2	D+9.9	−6.9	out	D	hit
OH-08	Likely R	4.3%	R+10.4	R+17.8 to R+3.0	R+4.3	−6.1	in	R	hit
OH-09	Tilt D	62.2%	D+1.6	R+5.1 to D+8.2	D+5.5	−3.9	in	D	hit
OH-10	Lean R	25.9%	R+3.4	R+10.2 to D+3.4	D+1.6	−5.0	in	D	miss
OH-11	Solid D	99.9%	D+57.7	D+46.9 to D+68.4	D+67.1	−9.4	in	D	hit
OH-12	Solid R	1.0%	R+22.9	R+30.4 to R+15.5	R+18.8	−4.2	in	R	hit
OH-13	Solid D	97.4%	D+12.6	D+5.2 to D+20.1	D+21.6	−8.9	out	D	hit
OH-14	Solid R	2.0%	R+14.5	R+21.9 to R+7.1	R+10.1	−4.4	in	R	hit
OH-15	Lean R	28.1%	R+3.1	R+10.1 to D+4.0	D+6.6	−9.7	out	D	miss
OK-01	Solid R	2.3%	R+14.1	R+22.3 to R+6.0	R+4.6	−9.5	out	R	hit
OK-02	Solid R	0.2%	R+43.2	R+52.2 to R+34.3	R+39.0	−4.2	in	R	hit
OK-03	Solid R	0.4%	R+37.8	R+46.4 to R+29.2	R+27.9	−9.9	out	R	hit
OK-04	Solid R	0.7%	R+27.2	R+34.7 to R+19.7	R+18.1	−9.1	out	R	hit
OK-05	Likely R	3.6%	R+10.5	R+17.5 to R+3.5	R+1.3	−9.3	out	R	hit
OR-01	Solid D	99.8%	D+44.4	D+35.2 to D+53.6	D+42.6	+1.9	in	D	hit
OR-02	Solid R	1.3%	R+18.8	R+26.1 to R+11.5	R+23.1	+4.2	in	R	hit
OR-03	Solid D	99.9%	D+48.3	D+38.8 to D+57.8	D+54.9	−6.7	in	D	hit
OR-04	Solid D	98.9%	D+19.8	D+12.7 to D+26.9	D+10.8	+9.0	out	D	hit
OR-05	Solid D	98.6%	D+16.6	D+9.4 to D+23.8	D+9.8	+6.8	in	D	hit
OR-06	Solid D	98.8%	D+19.7	D+12.3 to D+27.0	D+16.7	+2.9	in	D	hit
PA-01	Tilt R	34.0%	R+2.1	R+8.5 to D+4.4	D+5.7	−7.8	out	D	miss
PA-02	Solid D	99.8%	D+43.7	D+34.5 to D+52.9	D+61.7	−18.0	out	D	hit
PA-03	Solid D	100.0%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		D	not scored
PA-04	Solid D	99.1%	D+25.1	D+17.6 to D+32.6	D+34.4	−9.2	out	D	hit
PA-05	Solid D	99.6%	D+35.8	D+27.3 to D+44.2	D+44.4	−8.6	out	D	hit
PA-06	Solid D	98.9%	D+21.0	D+13.5 to D+28.4	D+29.0	−8.0	out	D	hit
PA-07	Lean D	80.0%	D+4.3	R+2.3 to D+10.8	D+12.4	−8.1	out	D	hit
PA-08	Tilt D	66.1%	D+2.1	R+4.5 to D+8.7	D+9.0	−6.8	out	D	hit
PA-09	Solid R	0.7%	R+28.7	R+36.5 to R+20.9	R+22.9	−5.8	in	R	hit
PA-10	Tilt D	61.3%	D+1.4	R+5.1 to D+8.0	D+10.4	−8.9	out	D	hit
PA-11	Solid R	1.8%	R+15.2	R+22.6 to R+7.7	R+10.8	−4.4	in	R	hit
PA-12	Solid D	99.1%	D+24.8	D+17.4 to D+32.3	D+31.3	−6.4	in	D	hit
PA-13	Solid R	0.4%	R+35.2	R+43.6 to R+26.9	R+34.9	−0.4	in	R	hit
PA-14	Solid R	1.0%	R+23.6	R+31.1 to R+16.2	R+15.0	−8.6	out	R	hit
PA-15	Solid R	0.6%	R+29.4	R+37.3 to R+21.6	R+27.6	−1.9	in	R	hit
PA-16	Solid R	1.6%	R+16.4	R+23.8 to R+8.9	R+7.7	−8.7	out	R	hit

Race	Rating	P(Republican loses)	Forecast margin	80% interval	Actual margin	Error	In 80%	Winner	Call
PA-17	Solid D	98.5%	D+16.4	D+9.0 to D+23.9	D+25.8	−9.4	out	D	hit
RI-01	Solid D	99.3%	D+28.8	D+21.6 to D+35.9	D+41.1	−12.4	out	D	hit
RI-02	Solid D	98.6%	D+17.4	D+10.5 to D+24.2	D+24.1	−6.7	in	D	hit
SC-01	Lean R	29.7%	R+3.0	R+10.6 to D+4.5	D+1.0	−4.1	in	D	miss
SC-02	Likely R	4.2%	R+10.6	R+18.0 to R+3.2	R+1.0	−9.6	out	R	hit
SC-03	Solid R	0.4%	R+34.3	R+42.5 to R+26.1	R+29.3	−5.0	in	R	hit
SC-04	Solid R	1.6%	R+16.3	R+23.5 to R+9.0	R+6.1	−10.2	out	R	hit
SC-05	Solid R	2.5%	R+14.3	R+22.7 to R+5.9	R+5.7	−8.6	out	R	hit
SC-06	Solid D	99.4%	D+28.6	D+20.9 to D+36.3	D+38.7	−10.2	out	D	hit
SC-07	Solid R	1.5%	R+16.3	R+23.6 to R+9.1	R+13.5	−2.8	in	R	hit
SD-AL	Solid R	1.1%	R+21.5	R+29.5 to R+13.6	R+28.0	+6.5	in	R	hit
TN-01	Solid R	0.1%	R+47.7	R+57.3 to R+38.2	R+30.8	−17.0	out	R	hit
TN-02	Solid R	0.8%	R+27.1	R+34.8 to R+19.5	R+16.6	−10.6	out	R	hit
TN-03	Solid R	0.8%	R+28.2	R+35.9 to R+20.6	R+17.4	−10.8	out	R	hit
TN-04	Solid R	1.3%	R+18.0	R+25.2 to R+10.8	D+0.1	−18.1	out	D leads	miss
TN-05	Likely R	4.4%	R+10.9	R+18.8 to R+3.0	R+4.9	−6.0	in	R	hit
TN-06	Solid R	1.6%	R+17.4	R+25.9 to R+9.0	R+3.3	−14.2	out	R	hit
TN-07	Solid R	1.5%	R+16.9	R+24.2 to R+9.6	R+2.2	−14.7	out	R	hit
TN-08	Solid R	1.8%	R+15.0	R+22.3 to R+7.7	R+5.3	−9.7	out	R	hit
TN-09	Likely R	6.4%	R+9.7	R+17.7 to R+1.7	R+1.1	−8.6	out	R	hit
TX-01	Solid R	0.3%	R+39.7	R+48.5 to R+30.9	R+38.1	−1.6	in	R	hit
TX-02	Solid R	3.1%	R+12.8	R+20.9 to R+4.6	R+2.0	−10.8	out	R	hit
TX-03	Solid R	1.4%	R+17.7	R+25.1 to R+10.4	R+5.5	−12.3	out	R	hit
TX-04	Solid R	1.3%	R+18.5	R+25.9 to R+11.1	R+12.1	−6.4	in	R	hit
TX-05	Solid R	1.9%	R+14.7	R+22.0 to R+7.3	R+2.9	−11.7	out	R	hit
TX-06	Solid R	1.2%	R+19.9	R+27.4 to R+12.5	R+4.3	−15.6	out	R	hit
TX-07	Solid D	99.5%	D+32.0	D+23.9 to D+40.1	D+43.3	−11.3	out	D	hit
TX-08	Solid R	1.7%	R+16.8	R+25.2 to R+8.3	R+6.4	−10.4	out	R	hit
TX-09	Lean R	15.7%	R+5.9	R+13.5 to D+1.7	D+15.1	−21.0	out	D	miss
TX-10	Likely R	4.6%	R+10.9	R+18.8 to R+2.9	R+7.5	−3.3	in	R	hit
TX-11	Solid R	0.8%	R+26.0	R+33.5 to R+18.5	R+19.0	−7.0	in	R	hit
TX-12	Solid R	1.4%	R+17.7	R+25.1 to R+10.2	R+6.2	−11.4	out	R	hit
TX-13	Solid R	0.4%	R+36.8	R+45.3 to R+28.2	R+30.5	−6.3	in	R	hit
TX-14	Solid R	1.6%	R+16.8	R+24.2 to R+9.3	R+8.0	−8.8	out	R	hit
TX-15	Lean D	73.1%	D+3.2	R+3.5 to D+9.8	D+24.6	−21.5	out	D	hit
TX-16	Solid D	99.1%	D+25.1	D+17.6 to D+32.5	D+41.5	−16.5	out	D	hit
TX-17	Solid R	1.7%	R+16.1	R+23.5 to R+8.7	R+7.1	−9.0	out	R	hit
TX-18	Solid D	99.9%	D+57.9	D+47.1 to D+68.6	D+72.1	−14.2	out	D	hit
TX-19	Solid R	0.3%	R+38.2	R+48.0 to R+28.3	R+39.0	+0.8	in	R	hit
TX-20	Solid D	99.6%	D+34.9	D+26.6 to D+43.3	D+55.2	−20.3	out	D	hit
TX-21	Likely R	6.0%	R+10.4	R+18.8 to R+2.0	R+9.0	−1.4	in	R	hit
TX-22	Solid R	3.3%	R+13.0	R+21.4 to R+4.6	R+3.6	−9.3	out	R	hit
TX-23	Lean R	26.6%	R+3.7	R+11.6 to D+4.2	D+8.2	−11.9	out	D	miss
TX-24	Likely R	3.6%	R+11.2	R+18.7 to R+3.8	R+6.9	−4.4	in	R	hit
TX-25	Solid R	1.5%	R+17.2	R+24.6 to R+9.8	R+7.5	−9.7	out	R	hit
TX-26	Solid R	1.5%	R+17.2	R+24.5 to R+9.9	R+10.4	−6.8	in	R	hit
TX-27	Solid R	2.0%	R+14.8	R+22.2 to R+7.3	R+2.3	−12.4	out	R	hit
TX-28	Lean D	89.0%	D+6.8	R+0.3 to D+13.9	D+36.1	−29.3	out	D	hit
TX-29	Solid D	99.6%	D+37.0	D+28.5 to D+45.6	D+59.9	−22.8	out	D	hit
TX-30	Solid D	99.9%	D+47.0	D+36.2 to D+57.8	D+65.3	−18.3	out	D	hit
TX-31	Solid R	1.4%	R+18.0	R+25.4 to R+10.6	R+8.9	−9.0	out	R	hit
TX-32	Solid R	2.0%	R+15.5	R+23.9 to R+7.1	R+2.9	−12.6	out	R	hit
TX-33	Solid D	99.8%	D+42.7	D+32.3 to D+53.0	D+57.1	−14.5	out	D	hit
TX-34	Lean D	78.8%	D+4.2	R+2.5 to D+10.9	D+16.0	−11.9	out	D	hit
TX-35	Tilt R	48.7%	R+0.2	R+7.8 to D+7.4	D+10.9	−11.0	out	D	miss
TX-36	Solid R	1.6%	R+16.3	R+23.7 to R+8.8	R+7.1	−9.1	out	R	hit

Race	Rating	P(Republican loses)	Forecast margin	80% interval	Actual margin	Error	In 80%	Winner	Call
TX-37	Solid D	99.9%	D+55.0	D+43.2 to D+66.9	D+67.5	−12.5	out	D	hit
TX-38	Likely R	4.0%	R+12.0	R+20.4 to R+3.5	R+4.2	−7.7	in	R	hit
UT-01	Solid D	99.5%	D+32.1	D+23.3 to D+40.8	D+43.9	−11.8	out	D	hit
UT-02	Likely R	9.5%	R+7.5	R+14.9 to R+0.2	R+7.4	−0.2	in	R	hit
UT-03	Solid R	0.9%	R+24.0	R+31.9 to R+16.0	R+21.0	−3.0	in	R	hit
UT-04	Solid R	1.9%	R+14.7	R+22.4 to R+7.0	R+14.5	−0.2	in	R	hit
VA-01	Tilt D	50.3%	D+0.1	R+6.5 to D+6.7	D+2.9	−2.9	in	D	hit
VA-02	Lean D	68.6%	D+2.5	R+4.3 to D+9.4	D+9.0	−6.4	in	D	hit
VA-03	Solid D	99.8%	D+44.3	D+35.0 to D+53.6	D+49.3	−5.0	in	D	hit
VA-04	Solid D	99.7%	D+41.5	D+32.5 to D+50.5	D+46.9	−5.4	in	D	hit
VA-05	Lean R	17.8%	R+4.9	R+11.8 to D+2.0	R+1.6	−3.4	in	R	hit
VA-06	Solid R	1.0%	R+23.1	R+30.2 to R+16.1	R+10.2	−12.9	out	R	hit
VA-07	Solid D	98.3%	D+15.6	D+8.2 to D+23.0	D+22.6	−7.0	in	D	hit
VA-08	Solid D	99.9%	D+53.8	D+43.6 to D+64.0	D+61.7	−7.9	in	D	hit
VA-09	Solid R	0.6%	R+30.9	R+38.9 to R+22.9	R+30.8	−0.0	in	R	hit
VA-10	Solid D	98.8%	D+18.9	D+11.5 to D+26.4	D+25.3	−6.4	in	D	hit
VA-11	Solid D	99.8%	D+41.9	D+32.9 to D+50.9	D+50.3	−8.4	in	D	hit
VT-AL	Solid D	99.5%	D+30.3	D+23.5 to D+37.1	D+34.4	−4.0	in	D	hit
WA-01	Solid D	99.6%	D+36.0	D+27.5 to D+44.5	D+35.1	+0.9	in	D	hit
WA-02	Solid D	99.5%	D+34.2	D+25.9 to D+42.5	D+33.5	+0.7	in	D	hit
WA-03	Tilt D	62.5%	D+1.7	R+5.1 to D+8.4	D+8.3	−6.6	in	D	hit
WA-04	Likely R	8.8%	R+9.0	R+17.4 to R+0.5	R+8.1	−0.9	in	R	hit
WA-05	Lean R	12.5%	R+6.5	R+13.9 to D+0.8	R+4.4	−2.1	in	R leads	hit
WA-06	Solid D	99.2%	D+27.0	D+19.3 to D+34.6	D+25.3	+1.7	in	D	hit
WA-07	Solid D	100.0%	D+74.4	D+61.4 to D+87.3	D+75.5	−1.1	in	D	hit
WA-08	Solid D	98.7%	D+18.4	D+11.0 to D+25.9	D+14.2	+4.2	in	D	hit
WA-09	Solid D	99.9%	D+48.9	D+39.1 to D+58.7	D+51.9	−3.0	in	D	hit
WA-10	Solid D	99.2%	D+27.6	D+19.9 to D+35.3	D+28.3	−0.6	in	D	hit
WI-01	Tilt R	35.1%	R+2.0	R+8.8 to D+4.8	D+3.9	−5.9	in	D	miss
WI-02	Solid D	100.0%	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a		D	not scored
WI-03	Tilt D	55.9%	D+0.8	R+6.4 to D+8.0	D+6.6	−5.8	in	D	hit
WI-04	Solid D	99.9%	D+54.3	D+44.0 to D+64.5	D+62.5	−8.2	in	D	hit
WI-05	Solid R	1.5%	R+16.9	R+24.3 to R+9.4	R+18.1	+1.2	in	R	hit
WI-06	Solid R	2.1%	R+13.9	R+21.2 to R+6.5	R+9.4	−4.4	in	R	hit
WI-07	Solid R	3.4%	R+13.1	R+21.6 to R+4.6	R+13.8	+0.7	in	R	hit
WI-08	Likely R	6.3%	R+9.0	R+16.4 to R+1.6	R+7.8	−1.2	in	R	hit
WV-01	Solid R	0.4%	R+34.7	R+42.7 to R+26.6	R+17.4	−17.2	out	R	hit
WV-02	Solid R	0.5%	R+33.3	R+41.5 to R+25.2	R+18.7	−14.6	out	R	hit
WY-AL	Solid R	0.5%	R+31.8	R+40.5 to R+23.1	R+20.7	−11.0	out	R	hit

Appendix B. Reproducibility

All scripts are in `scripts/postmortem/report/` on branch `analysis/postmortem-2026`. They read the model code and the first postmortem's loaders and write only under `docs/postmortem-2026/report/`.

Step	Script	Writes
Data layer, pinned results	`rdata.py`, `mdl.py`, `metrics.py`	export of results commit to a local cache
Scores against other forecasters	`a01_score.py`	`data/score.json`
Baselines	`a02_baselines.py`	`data/baselines.json`, `data/baseline_rows.csv`
Component ablations	`a03_ablate.py`	`data/ablation.json`, `data/ablation_2026.csv`, `data/ablation_past_cycles.csv`
Anatomy, intervals, seats, strengths	`a04_anatomy.py`	`data/anatomy.json`, `data/per_race.csv`
Trajectory and movement	`a05_trajectory.py`	`data/trajectory.json`, two CSV files
Joint draws and independence counterfactual	`a06_uncertainty.py`	`data/uncertainty.json`
Cost of each failure	`a07_costs.py`	`data/costs.json`
Market blend and poll errors	`a08_markets_polls.py`	`data/markets_polls.json`
Figures	`figures.py`, `style.py`, `fonts.py`	`figures/fig-*.png`
Text and PDF	`build.py`, `report.tmpl.md`	`report.md`, the PDF

To rebuild on a later results commit, set `RESULTS_COMMIT` in `rdata.py`, then run the scripts in the order above with the environment in `requirements.txt`:

```
cd scripts/postmortem/report
python -m venv .venv && .venv/bin/pip install -r requirements.txt
for s in a01_score a02_baselines a03_ablate a04_anatomy a05_trajectory a06_uncertainty a07_costs
a08_markets_polls figures build; do .venv/bin/python $s.py; done
```

Pinned inputs:

- Forecast: edition `ctm-2.2-20261103-4b0dfb7f0237` on `origin/forecast-data`, and the 17:09 UTC API capture of it in the forecaster-review workspace.
- Results: `origin/forecast-data` commit `89c2edda031e60517a2e13b865e70dfc9fef8c4f` (2026-11-13T22:39:23Z).
- Market panel at the freeze: commit `f4e842624102363a383950436a5aaa814dfaf6fd`.
- Other forecasters: `~/Projects/ctm-forecaster-review-2026` (not a git repository; final rule: last capture before 2026-11-03 23:00 UTC).
- Model code: `scripts/model/ctmm2` at the branch head, variant `expert_free_22`, run date 2026-11-03, generic ballot 8.3177.
- First postmortem: commits `b50db380ed` (scorecard), `930a6eedb2` (diagnosis and fixes), `63cbe7b87b` and `d104331179` (backtest protocol and results).

Seeds: bootstrap intervals use seed 20261103 with 10,000 resamples. The chamber-control simulation in the ablations uses seeds 20261103 to 20261122, 20,000 draws each, identical for the reference and every ablation. The one-factor shared fraction is calibrated to the published seat standard deviation (0.462 for the House, 0.722 for the Senate).

Figures use the site's own typefaces and party colors. Blue and red appear only where a mark means a party or the partisan direction of an error. The two other series colors were checked for color-vision separation with the palette validator of the charting guidelines.

Appendix C. Supplementary tables

Table C1. Sources: the race sets each is ranked in, the capture used, and the source's own last-update stamp as recorded in the capture.

Source	Common race sets it is ranked in	Final capture (UTC)	Source's own last-update stamp
50+1	Senate, House	2026-11-03T22:38Z	2026-11-03T05:53:08Z
DDHQ	Senate, Governor, House	2026-11-03T22:38Z	2026-11-03 16:45:54 UTC
ElectIt	Senate	2026-11-03T22:38Z	2026-11-03T03:15:46Z
Midterm Forecast	Senate, Governor	2026-11-03T22:38Z	Model run Nov 3, 1:39 PM ET
On Point Politics	Senate, Governor, House	2026-11-03T22:38Z	updated November 3, 2026
Poliwave	chamber odds or partial race coverage only	2026-11-03T22:38Z	polls through 2026-11-02
Race to the WH	Senate, Governor, House	2026-11-03T22:38Z	Last Updated on Nov 3, 2:36 PM ET
Rametta & Hare	Senate	2026-11-03T22:38Z	2026-11-03 04:29:00.980022
Silver Bulletin	Senate, Governor, House	2026-11-03T22:38Z	23:25:47 2 Nov 2026
Split Ticket	Senate, House	2026-11-03T22:38Z	not stated on page
VoteHub Complete	Senate, Governor, House	2026-11-03T22:39Z	2026-11-03T12:55:36.079982Z
VoteHub Legacy	Senate, Governor, House	2026-11-03T22:39Z	2026-11-03T12:55:36.079982Z

Table C2. Mean signed margin error by state, ours and the mean of the other models (all-vote points; negative means too Republican), sorted by our error.

State	Races	Our mean error	Field mean error	Gap	State	Races	Our mean error	Field mean error	Gap
WV	3	−15.3	−14.3	−1.0	HI	3	−5.7	−4.3	−1.4
IN	9	−13.7	−12.5	−1.2	VA	12	−5.5	−4.0	−1.5
TN	11	−12.4	−11.3	−1.1	CO	10	−5.3	−3.2	−2.1
TX	40	−11.4	−9.5	−1.8	FL	29	−4.8	−3.4	−1.4
MS	4	−11.0	−8.2	−2.8	NY	27	−4.6	−2.4	−2.2
AL	9	−10.5	−10.3	−0.2	IA	6	−4.0	−3.6	−0.4
NV	5	−10.4	−8.5	−1.9	KS	6	−4.0	−3.4	−0.6
NJ	12	−10.1	−8.9	−1.2	UT	4	−3.8	−11.3	+7.5
NC	15	−9.9	−8.4	−1.5	MI	15	−3.7	−1.0	−2.6
LA	3	−9.8	−5.8	−4.0	WI	8	−3.6	−2.7	−0.9
RI	3	−8.6	−6.0	−2.5	AR	6	−3.5	−4.8	+1.2
NM	5	−8.2	−5.1	−3.1	MD	9	−3.4	−1.5	−1.8
KY	7	−8.1	−7.9	−0.2	ME	3	−2.3	−1.1	−1.3
MO	8	−7.8	−8.1	+0.3	MN	10	−1.6	−0.4	−1.2
SC	9	−7.5	−6.4	−1.1	CT	6	−1.2	+0.7	−1.9
IL	19	−7.2	−4.9	−2.2	MA	7	−1.0	+0.6	−1.6
PA	17	−7.1	−5.8	−1.2	VT	2	−0.8	+1.7	−2.6
OK	7	−7.1	−8.3	+1.3	WA	10	−0.7	+0.8	−1.5
CA	43	−6.8	−3.4	−3.4	NE	4	+0.5	+0.3	+0.2
ND	1	−6.8	−7.4	+0.6	DE	2	+0.7	+0.1	+0.7
AZ	9	−6.6	−4.8	−1.8	ID	2	+1.1	−3.5	+4.6
WY	2	−6.6	−11.7	+5.1	OR	8	+2.2	+5.2	−2.9
NH	4	−6.2	−3.8	−2.4	MT	2	+2.7	−0.3	+3.0
OH	17	−5.9	−5.4	−0.6	SD	2	+5.6	+7.7	−2.1
GA	16	−5.8	−6.2	+0.4					